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ABSTRACT 
GEORGES BATAILLE'S NOTION OF TRANSGRESSION: THE QUESTION 
OF A PüSSillLE EXPERIENCE CONCERNING ART AND PHILOSOPHY. 
Mehmet Şiray 
M. F. A in Graphical Arts 
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Lewis Keir Johnson 
May, 2000 
This study aims at analysing George Bataille's notion of transgression. In this 
respect, the concepts of Bataille's discourse such as 'general economy', 'sovereign 
operation', 'inner experience', 'impossible', 'absence of myth' and 'sacred', are 
taken into consideration within the context of some recent post-structuralist texts. In 
addi tion, this study focuses on transgression in Bataille' s discourse reading it as a 
passage from interior to exterior. For this purpose, this study aims at showing that 
the transgression implied in Bataille's discourse transgresses itself. In that manner, 
this thesis brings two readings of Bataille's notion of transgression together: one is 
the reading of surrealism through George Bataille's and Andre Breton's approaches, 
and the other is the reading of the notion of transgression through some recent post-
stmcturalist texts. In the fınal analysis, this study discusses the discourse of 
transgression in Bataille with respect to both philosophy and art considering the 
problem of representation. 
Keywords: Transgression, general economy, impossible, inner experience, sacred, 
absence of myth, sovereign operation, representation, surrealism, post -structralism . 
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ÖZET 
GEORGE HATAILLE'IN iHLAL KA VRAMI: SANAT VE FELSEFE 
AÇISINDAN OLANAKLI BİR DENEY (İM) SORUSU 
Mehmet Şiray 
Grafik Tasanın Bölümü 
Yüksek Lisans 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yard. Doç. Dr. Lewis Keir Johnson 
May, 2000 
Bu çalışmada George Hataille'ın ihlal kavramının çözümlenmesi amaçlanıyor. Bu 
açıdan bakıldığında; genel ekonomi, egemen operasyonu, iç deney(im), olanaksız, 
mit'in yokluğu, kutsal gibi Bataille söyleminin kavramlan yapısal-cılık sonrası bazı 
metinler ışığında inceleme altına alınır. Ek olarak bu çalışma ihlal kavramını 
içeriden dışanya doğru bir pasaj olarak okuma eğilimindedir. Bu amaçla Hataille'ın 
ihlal kavramının kendisini ihlal ettiği gösterilmeye çalışılır. George Hataille'ın ve 
Andre Breton'un tartışmalaq üzerinden gerçeküstücülüğün, yapısalcılık sonrası 
metinler dolayımıyla da ihlal kavramının kendisinin bu tezde biraraya getirilmesi 
amaçlanmaktadır. Son tahlilde bu tez çalışması temsil sorununu gözönünde 
bulundurarak, felsefe ve sanat açısından ihlal söylemini irdeler. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: ihlal, genel ekonomi, olanaksız, iç deney(im), kutsal, mit'in 
yokluğu, egemen operasyonu, temsil, gerçeküstücülük, yapısalcılık sonrası. 
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CHAPTER ı 
ı. INTRODUCTION 
It is very diffıcult tö name Bataille's work as philosophy, anthropology, sociology or 
literature. In fact, one may consider Bataille' s work neither as one of these fıelds nor 
as the totality of them. Bataille's project may be regarded as a revolt against the 
categories of truth in metaphysics and his revolt against absolute truth always turns 
around the question of non-knowledge which makes the contemplation of knowledge 
possible for Bataille. 
Bataille always aims towards the transgression of the discourse of metaphysics. 
Although Bataille refuses any absolute truth, he believes general truth that had to be 
exposed. His project may be considered as the promise for a lost unity between 
psychic and social. In this process, Bataille mainly focuses on the excess which is the 
necessary condition of know!edge. On the other hand, one cannot construct such an 
awareness without contemplating inner experience in which knowledge and 
unknowledge are connected with each other. For Bataille, this margin is experienced 
at the limit of. the impossible character of existence. 
Usually, Bataille's project is called as paradoxical, but this paradoxical nature of 
Bataille's arguments is, at least for Bataille, necessary in order to reveal what is 
hidden in discourse. Hence, the consciousness of the limit(s) of discourse is necessary 
for the synthesis of consciousness and the unconscious in a lived experience. 
~ 
This thesis aims to explore the concept of transgression. Transgression- the breaking 
of a rule or law- is connected with the dynamics of artistic activity in modem art. By 
theorising transgression with respect to Bataille's analysis of general economy, I will 
be able to make a claim that transgression is essential both to our understanding of 
contemporary world and of art. 
In this thesis, I will focus on the following question: ın what sense Bataille' s 
sovereign operation or inner experience is an attempt to transgress the discourse of 
metaphysics. Whenever Bataille uses the term 'soven~ign operation', he insists on the 
necessary condition of general economy. He uses general economy as strictly 
different from traditional economics, which is related to restricted economy. Bataille 
differentiates restricted economy from general economy in order to expose the 
difference between what comes to discourse (such as philosophy and sciences) and 
what remains as an excess for discourse. On the one hand, for Batatille, restricted 
economy reduces the relation between individual and society to Homogeneity. On the 
' 
other hand, general economy, which is the economy of waste expenditure, is where 
the economising bias of economy is broken, and the meaning and the truth are linked 
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not to themselves but to their others: non-ıneaning and unknowledge. The originality 
ofBataille's approach lies in the way he appreciates this feeling of excess. 
It can be stated that Bataille' s notion of transgression could h elp us to rethink the 
question oftransgression. Although Bataille's work, as Foucault claimed in his article 
'A Preface to Transgression', is "a guiding light in the darkness of a new area of the 
unthought", Bataille's project, in some sense, lacks and limits the heterogeneity in 
transgression (Foucault quoted in Pefanis 1991, 40). In that sense, it can be clairned 
that transgression cannot be identi:fied by transgression itself, and the necessity of 
transgression in Bataille's work posits itself as the rule or the law of transgression. In 
that framework, Bataille's sovereign operation turns out to be an economy, the 
economy of restricted. In this respect, it can be proposed that general economy 
cannot be thought as distinct from restricted economy. Transgression of restricted 
economy as general economy shows itself in the production of restricted economy. 
Therefore, the transgression implied in Bataille's project transgresses itself. 
This thesis aims to discuss Bataille ·s notian of transgression and focuses on the 
evaluation of his approach in the cantext of some recent post-structuralist texts. It can 
be argued that Bataille's work has an influence on post-structuralism. Tbe thilh"'<:ers 
like Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, Blanchot consider Bataille's work directly. It can be 
claimed that Bataille's writing has a strong impact on these thinkers. In fact, it can be 
said that they share the same critical standpoint in the transgression of metaphysical 
discourse(s), although there are several differences intheir approaches. 
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This thesis brings two readings of Bataille's notion of transgression together: one is 
through the postrnodemism, such a reading is through Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard and 
Blanchot, and the other is through surrealism in which the debate between Breton and 
Bataille constitutes the surrealists' approach and gives rise to the discussion which 
aims to comprehend the transgression in surrealism. 
In chapter two, this thesis will attempt to give an analysis of some of Bataille's 
notions such as inner experience, sovereign operation, sacrifice, impossible, general 
and restricted economies, heterogeneity and the absence of myth. In this chapter, it 
will be claimed that Bataille's work may not be considered as aiming at the essential 
separation between social and personal being. For Bataille, sacred is the unifying 
aspect of society and without this fundamental element the continuance of society is 
not possible. In that manner, chapter two will concentrate on Bataille's notion of 
sacred, which is for Bataille, at the centre of communication. 
In c hapter two, Bataille' s emphasis on excess is discussed, because for him sacred 
can be seen in extreme emotions, in useless activities. They all take the form of 
beterology and expel homogeneity. In this respect, Bataille's book Eroticism is 
emphasised. It can be claimed that the useless activity and extreme emotions are put 
into ccnsideration in Bataille's sovereign operation. This nature attributed to sacred 
can only be understood by Bataille's comprehension of death. The section, 'Death, 
Communicatmn and The Experience of Limits', in chapter two, aims to construct 
Bataille's analysis of death as an active principle andasa completion oflife. 
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Bataille claims that it is not possible to contemplate philosophy without taking 
economic factors into account, but his approach on economic factors cannot be 
understood by conventional economics. In seetion three, 'Expenditure and General 
Economy' it will be argued that his sovereign operation is strictly connected to his 
notion of general economy. In order to understand the economic~l factors in life for 
Bataille, one must comprehend life's inner activity. In that sense, Bataille's notion of 
expenditure plays an important role in understanding this inner activity. In this 
section, it will be attempted to discuss the relation between restricted and general 
economy by following Bataille's notion of non-productive expenditure. In this 
section, it will be claimed that Bataille aims to transgress restricted economy, and 
general economy provides a basis for this transgressive activity. 
Bataille gives credit to some primitive societies ın his account of sacred. Aztec 
societies and Potlatch tribe are crucial for Bataille in order to exhibit the lost nature 
of the sacred. Bataille shows how excess and transgression play an important role in 
these primitive societies. In chapter two, it will be argued that the exemplifıcation of 
sacrifice in these societies is problematic. Asa result, chapter two aims to reconstruct 
Bataille's work in the light of his main notions discussed above. In that manner, this 
chapter helps us to place his notion of transgression in his discourse. 
Chapter three combines two things together: one concems Bataille's arguments in 
surrealism, the other discusses Bataille's arguments against surrealism and especially 
against Andre Breton. In fact, surrealism can be regarded as a shifting terrain of 
representation using difference in order to generate meaning. It can be claimed that 
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the desired effect in surrealism was to reveal the unconscious in representation, and 
to undo prevalent conceptions of order and reality. Hence, chapter three discusses 
two modes of representations in surrealism: one is Breton's surrealism, the other is 
Bataille' s surrealism in w hi ch Bataille tries to construct a new mode of 
representation. 
In chapter three, it will be showed that surrealism aims to make desires manifest, in 
which the state of ambiguity is the condition imposed on spectators reading of 
images, so the movement from fragment to fragment is inherent in looking at images. 
In fact, it can be argued that the reception of Freud's psychoanalysis plays an 
important role in surrealist project, although there were different uses of Freud's 
psychoanalysis in Bataille's and Breton's works. 
In chapter three, it will be attempted to discuss Breton's idea of surrealism in which 
surrealists posit their work as a strategy 'from the point of view' of the unconscious 
(Fer 1993, 176). Hence, it will be emphasised that Breton's use ofpsychoanalysis is 
different from Freud's psychoanalysis. For Breton, dream work is crucial for the 
surrealist approach. Madness, hysteria, earlier myths, memory lapses and day dreams 
are also important for surrealism, because they searched for the mechanisms at work 
in unconscious. Breton argues that all these repressed conditions are means to 
transgress the established boundaries. 
The seetion displaying the debate between Bataille and Breton in chapter three 
discusses their way of using myth in their projects. They both emphasise the absence 
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of myth in contemporary world. On the other hand, Bataille accuses of Bretonian 
surrealism as becoming a part of capitalist production, because Bretonian surrealism 
aims to go back to the past in order to recreate the notion of ri tual by imbuing ri tual 
with meaning. For Bataille there is no possibility of imbuing any ritual with meaning. 
No ritual, for Bataille can go beyond the immediate context of i~ performance. In 
that manner, chapter three also discusses how surrealism makes a fetish of ritual and 
in what sense Bataille shares this outcom e in his analysis of the absence of myth in 
contemporary world. In chapter three, I will concentrate on the need for communism 
in surrealism, because the surrealists claimed that the reinvigoration of myth could 
take shape only through communism. 
It will be showed in chapter three that there are differences between Bataille and 
Breton in their understanding of beauty. By separating normality from pathology, 
Breton claims that there is always residual hopefor freedoru and beauty. On the other 
hand, Hataille proposes a real practice of imbalance. Therefore, beauty, which is only 
in the moment of obsolescence, is linked with decay and death. 
The last seetion in chapter three, 'Crime and Art' focuses on the surrealist reception 
of erime as the revelation of a real nature possessed by human beings. Hence, this 
seetion aims to comprehend in what sense the surrealists see erime as the 
transgression of taboos, the release of a desire that constitutes the origin of art. In this 
section, it will be attempted to claim that Hataille sees erime different from 
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surrealists. He conceıves cnme as both hiding and proclaiming itself. Bataille 
criticises surrealists in that they turned erime into art at the expanse of erime itself. 
Chapter three aims to present that while the transgression in Bretonian surrealism 
searches the possibility of a new language or a new mode of representation in 
~ 
repressed desires and in unconscious wishes in w hi ch surrealism consists of the claim 
of truth within the project, Bataille, on the other hand, claims that desire is always 
linked to repression that it constitutes, so self is only caught up in mobility in which 
the transgression of limits and boundaries are at work. Hence, Bataille rejects the 
surrealists' projectina sensethat the surrealists stabilise the concepts and the self. As 
a result, chapter three discusses how transgression is at work both in surrealism and 
in Bataille's discourse. 
Chapter four deals with Bataille's comprehension of Hegel's master and slave 
dialectics. In fact, this chapter discusses how Bataille contemplates Hegelian notions 
with respect to the notion of transgression. Chapter four begins with discussing 
Bataille's famous article, HegeL Death and Sacrifice. The first section, 'Negation as 
Affirmation', aims to comprehend the notion of negation both in Bataüle' s discourse 
and in Hegel's master and slave dialectics. In this respect for Bataille, the abstract 
negation as an unconsidered fact in Hegel's dialectic is evaluated in sovereign 
operation as an active principle. In that sense, Bataille argues that sovereign operation 
puts abstract hegation into work. Hen ce, the seetion one discusses how Bataille places 
his general economy and sovereign operation in the consumption of bodily energy 
outside the world of rational and useful productivity. In that sense, Bataille argues 
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that laughter, eroticism or the experience of the sacred exceeds the logic of 
metaphysics. In this section, I will focus on Jacques Derrida's article, From 
Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism without Reserve, in order to show in 
what sense Bataille's sovereign operation transgresses Hegelian discourse. By 
daiming Bataille's general economy and his sovereign operation~refers to restricted 
economy, to the economy ofHegel, I will show that sovereign operation is the desire 
for m eaning attributing a meaning to the absence of meaning. Seetion two and three, 
'The Writing of the Sacred' and 'General Economy' aim to develop the discussion 
which turns around the notion of transgression in Bataille's discourse. In these 
sections, there will be attempted to show Derrida' s two forms of writing in order to 
comprehend Bataille's general economy and sovereign operation. 
In seetion four, 'General Writing' debates the notion of neutrality. Derrida claims 
that what erases the traces of classical discourse is not alone the concept of sovereign, 
nor the sovereign operation. It is the discourse, of sovereignty, which neutralises 
metaphysical discourse. In this respect, seetion four discusses Bataille's notion of 
sovercign operation and sovereignty with respect to the work of neutralisation. 
Besides, I will consider Rodolphe Gasche's arguments that eriticise Bataille's project 
as aiming to transgress the discourse of philosophy. He claims that exceeding the 
discourse of philosophy cannot possibly m ean to step outside tlıe closure, because the 
outside belongs to the categories of the inside. Therefore, seetion four intends to 
..... 
develop and sharpen the analysis of transgression. 
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Seetion five, 'Blanchot and the Limit-Experience' purposes to explain Blanchot's 
notion oflimit-experience with respect to Bataille's 'at stake' operation. This seetion 
aims to comprehend the play of thought and the infinite affirmation of thought in 
Blanchot in order to show the impossibility of absolute transgression that differs in 
itself from discourse and law. 
Finally, the last seetion considers Bataille's comprehension of Lascaux paintings. 
Bataille argues that Lascaux paintings present transgression in relation to a sacred 
moment of fıguration. Bataille in his study of Lascaux, constructs the fıguration as an 
origin of art. In this section, I will use Bataille' s argument against him daiming that 
if prehistoric art is the other or the origin of art, it is situated within the same status, 
and rather the beginning of art shows also the end of art. 
The last part of the thesis begins witlı Bataille's proj~ct in Documents. In Documents, 
Bataille discusses the nature of representation in philosophy and sciences. For him, 
scientists and philosophers use dictionari~s in order to give references for the 
consistency of their systems. In that sense, they produce dictionaries in order to 
generate meaning. In these systems, one word is linked to another without 
contemplating how it works and what sort of space it creates. This space for Bataille, 
is the job of words. Therefore, Bataille reorganises some of the words that he found 
necessary for his project, such as formless or low. In this respect, the conclusion 
examines Bataille's efforts in connecting words with their jobs. Besides, this part 
gathers Bataille's notion of transgression with respect to language. In that sense, it 
can be claimed that Bataille's project aims to transgress the boundaries that 
lO 
surrounded the communication. The metaphor of 'dust' in Documents unveils this 
phenomenon. As a result, conclusion part discusses in what sense Bataille's attempt 
can be thought as legal and consistent work with respect to the notion of 
transgression. 
ll 
CHAPTER2 
2. A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO BATAILLE'S DISCOURSE 
2.1. BATAILLE'S NOTION OF UNKNOWLEDGE 
Foucault claims that "Bataille's thought is a guiding light in the darkness of a new 
area of the unthought"(Foucault quoted in Pefanis 1991, p 40). Bataille was aware of 
the fact that knowledge is always in connection with unknowledge. He defıned this as 
a dialectical relation between knowledge and unknowledge. Hence, rather than 
accepting knowledge in its totality, he grasps it in a relation to unknowledge. He 
refuses any absolute truth. But, stili he believes general truth to the universe that had 
to be sought out. One can recognise this truth in the margin of between knowledge 
and unknowledge. What is the meaning of such a transgression of the discourse of 
Metaphysics? ls it an attempt to :::each a simple outside or a beyand philosophy? Can 
sameone contemplate this truth without taking into account of metaphysical 
knowledge in the history of philosophy? Bataille claims, before we contemplate non-
knowledge, we must pass through knowledge. The former can never precede the 
latter. 
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According to Bataille, knowledge and power can never be taken as independent from 
individual's self-experience and social reality. They are dynamic concepts inherent in 
human activity and having no meaning in themselves. Power does not exist in the 
abstract as it does in Foucault's analysis. Both Foucault and Bataille saw excess as a 
necessary condition for knowledge but for Bataille, it can not be thought as 
disconnected from unknowledge. In this respect, with this concept of un-knowledge 
in mind, we know this margin, which exists in this relation between knowledge and 
un-knowledge, with knowledge that is not knowledge at all. May be the excess of 
knowledge makes knowledge possible in the first place. He pointed out that the limits 
cannot be considered without engaging with complementary need for non-
knowledge. 
Plotnitsky claims that" Bataille's 'concept' of sur(sur-realism) suggests, this margin 
-that which is minimised within the text of philosophy- will exceed the centre in the 
power of efficacy and will be reconfigured as one of the conditions of the possibility 
of all centres"(1993, p 68). The role of this margin is crucial, yet it cannot be 
absolutely or unconditionally central. Bataille saw excess as a path of awarencss. 
Nevertheless, he did not consider excess in isolation from a sense of order. Duality is 
necessary for him and his position is a refusal of all hope placed in any form of 
transcendence. Hence, his addition to philosophy can be shown as a confrontation 
between existence and i ts paradoxical (impossible) character. In fact, the question of 
' 
existence is non-sense. The problem of existence lies in socialisation. 
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In second manifesto of surrealism Andre Breton claims that "everything tends to 
make us believe that there exists a point of mind at which death and life cease to be 
perceived contradictorily"(Richardson 1994, 26). Bataille's work is based on the 
supposition that all things are interconnected with each other and it is possible to 
discover the correspondences between them. Therefore, there ~ is no longer any 
priority between knowledge and un-knowledge or internal being and extemal reality 
or individual and society. 
Derrida says, alluding to Kant, but possibly also with Bataille's (un) concept of' un-
knowledge' in mind, "we know this ... only now, and with a knowledge that is not a 
knowledge at all "(1976, 164). Bataille claims that the true relationship between 
knowing and doing lies in a lived experience. A lived experience (may be as a surplus 
value) w hi ch would effect the synthesis- at on ce decisive and impossible - of 
consciousness and the unconscious, which is for Bataille the ultimate possibility of 
that which is. In this process, present and future involving the experience of un-
knowledge would emerge in a lived experience. Hence, the one, which exceeds, is 
preserved in the trace of experience. Trace of experience, because Bataille tried to 
deal with the impossibility of the impossible. One is the impossibility of experience; 
the other is the impossibility of showing present and future in a lived experience. In 
this dangerous and surprising work, Bataille did not aim to appropriate thought. The 
theme of exclusion in classical philosophy refers not to the myth of origin of 
humanity, but to its end. As Dennis Hollier claimed in his article on Bataille, 'The 
Dualist Materialism of Georges Bataille': "rather than a system of thought, Bataille' s 
14 
dualism is an attitude of thought; it is not a dualist system, but a will to dualism, a 
resistance to system and homogeneity"(Botting and Wilson 1998, 62). 
Anxiety Bataille placed at the heart of his philosophy. For Bataille, this is true since 
all communication involves loss, but this is the price that has to be paid for someone 
who needs to communicate. It is a necessity that can not be avoided. Therefore, the 
condition of life would be silen ce for Bataille. 
2.2. THEMES AND INTELLECTUAL BACKGROUND 
For Bataille, there is no any essential separation between social and personal being. 
Society is like an entity. The collectivity between individual and society make 
impossible to establish true or absolute reality, because there is always an account of 
the distortion that is brought by one's own perspective on the material. Hence, it is 
difficult to determine boundaries of collectivities. 
According to Bataille, the fundamental element that makes possible unity and 
continuance of society is the sacred. For him, sacred is the unifying aspect of society, 
taking shape where people need to offer themselves up ina sacrificial consecration to 
the values of the collectivity. The sacred is the forbidden element of society that 
exists at the margin where different realities meet. Sacred shows the need for 
communication and it is shaped in this process. If we accept that the sacred is by 
definition the totality of the world and s ince w hat embodies totality can be considered 
sacred, how can it be subject to the abstraction from totality that is the necessary pre-
15 
requisite for scientific analysis? In the vortex of communication in which the essence 
of the sacred is founded the distinctions that scientific research needs for its 
methodology are broken-down. Faced with reality of the sacred, Bataille asks, how 
can disinterested knowledge do other than fail at a basic level, since it is constraint to 
"itself serve to alter the meaning of what it reveals"(Battaille quoted in Richardson 
1994, 48). How can there be (the) sacred state at the heart of the vortex of 
communication when the absence or the lack of sacred is placed into discourse? 
Perhaps, the reason for Bataille is that we lack on essential factor of life. This causes 
an anarchy or crisis. This led to the sacred inevitably meant that one had to make an 
abstraction of it and transiate into the terms of a lost paradise and so, seek it only in 
societies that were far from us in time or space. We can not accept it as being in 
present. Therefore, the sacred can only exist as a contradiction of profane or it 
survives in primitive societies. This means that other is derivative. According to 
Bataille, sacred can be observed intemally and extemally. Sacred is a question of 
communication. Hence, it seerus that the place of sacred in societies as unifying 
element, which is the possibility of completeness, is paradoxical. Although Bataille 
aims to place sacred as an impossible experience in the heart of communication, 
sacred can not come to light as present, so its existence always shows impotency. In 
fact, Bataille was aiming to demonstrate sacred was to be a starting point so as to 
understand the paradoxical structure of communication. In this respect, may be he 
was restraint--to conceive sacred as complete being in order to escape from scientific 
analysis. Nevertheless, showing that the only possibility to understand sacred as 
unifying element between society and individual, revealing it before the experience 
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of it, presupposes sacred as an empty structure which stands far from Bataille's 
insistence on experience as a present activity, without which nothing is possible. 
Bataille distinguishes societies' structures into two: homogeneous and heterogeneous 
societies. Homogeneity reduces itself to functions and it shows organİsed societies. 
Homogeneity causes capitalism and it destructs heterogeneity which engages with 
sacred. Heterogeneous society needs to take account of points of intersections where 
societies exist in the interconnection of different cultures and social structures, which 
have been expelled from the structure of the integral body. Sacred can be seen in 
bodily exhalation (blood, tears ... ), in extreme emotions (laughter, anger, 
drunkenness, and ecstasy.), in useless activity (poetry, games, erime, and eroticism). 
They all take the form of beterology and expel homogeneity. According to Bataille, 
they are all the possibility of othemess. They assert the value of the forbidden, which 
is allowed free play at times of transgression, a festival of expenditure and loss that 
complements the needs of work and the rule of law. In that sense, Bataille's 
understanding of sacred resembles to fear in the philosophy of Heidegger. Its 
unifying element appears only in those extreme emotions. Although it seerus as if 
opposed to the profane in scientific analysis, contradicting its opposite and existing 
with respect to i ts other, in those activities ( extreme emotions) it exists as totalising 
and directly. 
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We can daim that although it seems paradoxically, it stands in the last analysis as 
being plural. This nature attributed to the sacred can only be understood with 
Bataille's comprehension of death. 
For Bataille, death is an active principle. Death completes life; its aim and dissolution 
is also the negation of life; its condition and essential quality. Even as life itself 
n egates death in the moment of reproduction and there after seeks to exclude it, death 
remains as an ever-present active principle that alone makes life possible. Death 
brings into play continuity and discontinuity by showing the essential quality of 
being. For him, to live is to exist within limits. Richardson claims, " being always 
accords with the limit that defines it."(l994, 37). Our essence is thus to be incomplcte 
beings. Discontinuous being aspires to achieve a state of continuity with what is 
external to it. This unity is, for Bataille, impossible, our condition depends on loss. 
Bataille insists that we, discontinuous beings, always desire to transcend the limits 
that define us. This anguislı which is marked by an urge towards what is impossible. 
In that sense, anguish is the fundamentai condition of existence. It is the recognition 
of the incompleteness of being, yearning for a lost continuity. A sense of anguish, as 
an urge to go beyond our limits that defines our existence whilst at the same time 
being connected with the nakedness of existence, a nakedness that, for Bataille, is 
rending and painful. 
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There is always something that holds Bataille back from any sense of the 
transformation of being. Though he wanted his work to be treated as a who le, he di d 
not want the different elements to be subsumed together. Richardson claims, 
"Above all science needed to recognise the need not only for knowledge but 
also for non-knowledge. W ithout the latter, 'knowledge is an ~enslavement', a 
meaningless accumulation that destroys the meaning of life. He wrote that we 
are 'enslaved by knowledge' that there is a servility fundamental to all 
knowledge, an acceptance of a mode of life such that each moment has 
meaning only in terms of another, or of others to follow"(l994, 66). 
Against this enslavement knowledge needs to be recognised as what is: the path to 
knowledge is impossible. But it is in recognising this impossible quality that the real 
m eaning of knowledge becomes apparent. B attaille says, " the door must remain open 
and shut at the same time"(1998, 92). Hence, true knowledge needs to recognise its 
provisional nature and stands against etemal truths. 
2.3. EXPENDITURE AND GENERAL ECONOMY 
Bataille claims that it is not possible to contemplate philosophy without taking 
economic factors into account, nor the economy without considering the effusion of 
poetry. He always focuses on the struggle between project of totality and one 
person' s life experience. 
Bataille' s approach to economıc questions quite openly contradicts the basis of 
economic science; one can understand the diffıculty of integrating his theories into 
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any sort of conventional economics. He uses general economy as strictly different 
from traditional economics, which he defıned as being concemed with the restricted 
economy. It is also connected to the notion of sovereignty and ties in with the 
interplay between individual needs and the requirements of social interaction. 
Analysis of general economy must consider economic factors in t~eir totality, taking 
into account not simply the objective fact of the fınancial structure of society, but 
also the social and psychological factors upon which it is founded. 
For Bataille, life is energy that is always founded in work. Humanity has needed to 
control this basic principle of life. The human has developed an urge to exist in 
duration, so has tried to create a secure environment. This shows that societies are not 
primarily structured in order to satisfy the needs of subsistence ( although this is an 
important factor), but through a need to obtain prestige by accumulating a surplus 
that could be disposed of in a prodigal way. As a result, there is a useless 
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consumption (life strives to expend itselfuselessly). According to Bataille, the notion ... 
of expenditure is very important in order to comprehend life's inner activity. For 
Bataille, the notion of expenditure is in the nature of things for any given organism to 
produce more than it needs for its own survival. As such, economic activity is 
determined not by scarcity but by the need for circulation of the excess wealth 
produced. This circulation between individual and society resembles to father and son 
relationship. Father who denies his son whilst providing clothes, food ... for his 
surviving; this denial is not for production. This exclusion is superfıcial. Richardson 
claims, 
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" The son is guaranteed security to the extent that he abides by what his father 
has in mind for him. But to the extent that he does remain true to his 
subservience, the son must be untrue to himself, and remains incapable of 
expressing what he really cares about, which has to be hidden away. As the 
key, son's real needs lies in the unavowed pleasures rather than the practical 
activities his father consign him to, so the key to economy, he asserts, lies not 
in the productive process, but in the surplus that must be expended. But this is 
not an expenditure that should feed back into the productive process but one 
that is excessive and serves no useful purpose, indeed functions in a way to 
destroy the very productive process itselfby exploding its truth."(1994, 70-71). 
In so far as we do accumulate wedoso only in order to expend the surplus we have 
acquired in a glorious way and for a purpose that satisfıes us precisely because it 
serves no utilitarian purpose. 
According to Bataille, there are distinct elements of the process of consumption. The 
one is reducible part, which is represented by the minimum needed for "the 
immediate conservation of life" -restricted economy and the other is wealth that 
needed to be created precisely for "unproductive expenditure" -general economy 
(1988, 18-23). This relation beP.veen general and restricted economy causes the 
constitution of society. In order to be able to increase production and to cause to 
produce, capitalism explored leisure time. People need play and rest but this is 
negatively related to the need for work. 
.... 
In the fırst place, Bataille denies that a concession of leisure is at all necessary to the 
smooth functioning of the economy, since the principle of work is inherent in 
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mankind's nature and we necessarily produce more energy than we need for our 
subsistence. He asserts that leisure and the expenditure it demands lies at the heart of 
the effective economy, and in this perspective any work that simply satisfıes 
accumulation is a perversion of real human needs. Capitalİst society, which is 
explicitly based on economy of scarcity, is thus a perverse society, devoted not to the 
satisfaction of its own needs, but to the benefıt of a particular part of society that 
controls the productive process. The displacement of economic needs from 
expenditure to accumulation serves to unbalance mankind's inner sensibility. Hence, 
individual and society are alienated from their own beings (reduction to 
homogeneity). In that framework, society is more dominant than individual. 
Nevertheless, capitalism does not give any concession to society as it made for the 
individual. Therefore, society always stands as an abstraction. 
For Bataille, society is a living body and in a detailed analysis, there can be no 
discrimination between society and individual. Like individuals, societies need non-
productive expenditure. For instance, war is an expenditure that represents the 
continuation of the economy, in contemporary societies, by other means. Thinking 
society as if it is a non-being and giving undervalue to it causes savage revenge that 
goes beyond all limits. Expenditure, in that sense, is more important than 
accumulation. It is the whole ideology of the reformation that provided the moral 
rationalisation necessary to give accumulation its legitimation. The act of giving is no 
longer perceived as a necessary gift to the community, but a voluntary dispensation 
that remains under the control of the person who makes the gift. This process of 
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giving reduces the person who takes this 'gift'. Bataille calls this 'universal 
meanness'. Hence, value became displaced. Therefore, economy is organİsed 
according to the relation with things rather than the relation between individuals. In 
this respect, Bataille calls capitalism as an unreserved surrender to things. 
Social distinction is the basic reference for individuals. Servility is established as the 
principle against which one measures oneself. Although social structure seems not to 
insist on class distinction- because it works as if it defends equality between 
individuals-distinction and ability to make it (power) is testedin servility rather than 
sovereignty. This doesn't mean that the need for unproductive expenditure has been 
overcome. It survives in 'accursed' form. The human need expressed in luxury, 
mournıng, war, cults, monuments, games, spectacles, arts and non-reproductive 
sexual activity remains as great as ever, but everything is done to divert such activity 
( unproductive expenditure) to the needs of utility rather than accept them as the pure 
effusion they are. Hence, societies give a place for joyful destruction of accumulated 
wealth. 
Social cohesion is an active principle that is ernbodied in myth and affırms the social 
body. This gives to each individual a sense of being in which social and individual 
reality is one. According to Mauss, powers of exchange covers all social domains so 
that not only goods and property are exchanged but also entertainment, rituals, dance, 
even women"(Richardson 1994, 77). So, the person receiving gift must return it. In 
such a way wealth circulates. The system works that both establish social hierarchy 
and it also actstoprevent destructive class conflict. Therefore, a kind of obligation is 
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created by exchange (Bataille takes this form from Mauss). In that manner, Bataille 
researches Aztec and Potlatch societies. Bataille sees in Aztec ritual sacrifice, which 
is devoted to the sun, a movement of expenditure that is comparable to the sun's 
generosity. Richardson claims that "Aztec societies are servitude rather than 
sovereign as Bataille insisted, because what is sacrificed can not b: sacrificed" (1994, 
77-9). Therefore, there is no sacrifice in itself in these societies. In Aztec societies, 
we can talk about duplication in their sacrificial ceremony. The survival of the 
warrior depends on his death in a sacrificial act. In that manner sacrificial act turns 
back to its profane nature and in a sense, it works against itself. This sacrificial act 
resists societies' homogeneous structure by serving taboo. 
According to Richardson, there is no excess and transgression in Aztec societies in 
which sacrifice is neutralised and reduced to something daily and habitual. The 
second example is the Potlatch tribe situated in the north west of Canada. This 
example shows that the concept of 'gift' lies in the centre of economy rather than 
trade. So, trade is later. Hence, economic life was not begun with 'self interest'. 
Excess in the tribe of Potlach was not for the purpose of the decoııstruction of wealth 
but for its maintenance and distribution. 
For Bataille, sacrifice is the antithesis of production, it is a consumption that is 
concemed only with the moment and may be he does not say that sacrifice is made 
for the sal va tion of mankin d. According to him, sacrifice is the opposite of salvation 
and served the social solidarity of the immediate group, not of mankind in its 
generality. Its aim is to protect the instant. Sacrifice, performed in public, testifies to 
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the strength of the social fabric and only takes place within societies which are 
founded around intimacy and heterogeneity. Sacrifice, for Bataille, can be seen as the 
experience of self-sufficient societies that cohere ina heterogenous way. How cana 
body produce more energy than it will expend? According to Bataille, this emerges 
from the inner drives of the organism. It is not spontaneously produced out of 
nothing. 
As human beings, then, is it not precisely because we have an inner need for work 
that our energ-y surplus is created? Nevertheless, if we insist on work more than the 
energy we produce and expand for surviving, this energy can escape from our 
understanding. Bataille's argument about eroticism is based on the fact that work is 
indeed what determines our being and without which we should 'flounder' although 
this conception consists of inconsistencies. Michael Richardson asks that if 
expenditure isa human necessity, it is so only through the prior need to accumulate. 
Bataille was right to focus on the problem of surplus value and the necessity for 
expenditure, but it needs to be emphasised that expenditure has meaning only in 
relation to accuınulation. The problem arises when he isolates expenditure from the 
entirety of social relations. It is difficult to see how any conception of a general 
e~onomy can have analytic value unless it treats the problems of accumulation and 
expenditure as being inextricably linked. We can argue that no separation is possible. 
In that manner, surplus value is still a problem. If a surplus energy is naturally 
generated within us, then how does this occur? He saysit is simply anatural process. 
But, is it not the case that the production of energy requires the intervention of the 
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will into being that produces the surplus? Is it not precisely because we have an inner 
need for work that we are able to satisfy more than our own energy needs and that, 
deprived of this urge, we should immediately cease to produce the energy we need 
for our survival? Is it not, then, urgent to engage with the nature of our will to work 
before we can seriously consider the importance of expenditure? Richardson says 
following Norman O. Brown's perspective, 
"The role of economic activity lies not in the exchange, but in the act of 
giving. For Norman the gods exist in order to structure the human need for self-
sacrifice. It is for this reason necessary to create a surplus"(1994, 89-91). 
Like Bataille, Brown agrees that it is guilt that provides the basis for the need to give, 
which is equally tied in with neurosis and excretion. To this extent Brown is in 
accord with Freud who ccnsidered human guilt to be based in a primal erime which 
can be mitigated only through social solidarity. Brown, rather than Freud, believes 
that primal erime is an infantile fantasy created by the child as a brake on the 
excessive vitality (the id) which it is unable to control. So, sexual organisation is 
therefore constructed by the infantile ego to repress bodily vitality. 
Brown locates guilt as an infantile fantasy that serves to place a brake on instinctual 
response defined by the id. Why does such a need arise? He ascribes it to neurosis. 
Bataille, on the other hand, is very clear about where such a primary need for 
repression aı;ises: it is a manifestation of mankind's guilt at separating itself from 
nature and assuming a mastery over it by means of work. If this is neurotic it is stili 
essential to our sense of us as human beings. This sense of guilt li es in an elementary 
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alienation. According to Marx, alienation estranges man from nature, from his own 
active function, from vital activity, from others (Richardson 1994, 90-2). Like Marx, 
Bataille considers that all alienation is self-alienation and society is also alienated. 
Social cohesion is guarantied by heterogeneity. The overcoming of alienation can 
only be achieved by engaging with new possibilities of heteroge~eity. This means a 
confrontation of one's own alienated self. For Bataille, the recreation of 
heterogeneity begins when no longer perceive a distinction between our own desire 
and those of society. Bataille denies Hegel's contention that the slave could obtain 
liberation through work, since work is the condition of enslavement. The only way 
for the slave to obtain his freedom was to refuse work and eiıgage freely in non-
servile, heterogeneous activity. In this respect, the proletariat can only be free by way 
of rejecting i ts status as worker. In so doing they assert their own universality. But, in 
rejecting work which is surely man's universal experience, could the proletariat still 
be seen as a universal class? Richardson claims that Bataille, in an economy based 
upon the concems of the restricted economy, is incapable of handling the 
implications raised by the general economy. He looks towards the possibility of 
establishing the basis for economy, which would respond to the natural rhythms of 
the world rather than upon the calculated needs of mankind. An economy based upon 
the needs of expenditure in today' s world would be a contradiction in terms: it would 
negate itself at the moment it was put into practice, particularly given that the needs 
of expenditure can not by definition be calculated. What was necessary was a 
completely new vision of the way society was structured so that the general economy 
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could assume its appropriate form. It required the reconstitution of heterogeneity. 
Capitalism treats (restricted economy) productive needs as the primary. 
This is the illusion. Bataille, may be, tends to make a fetish of expenditure or he 
establishes an inverted form of the restricted economy. In that case, Bataille's work 
bears witness to what came up as the dice were thrown. His work can be considered 
as a beginning not as an end. 
2.4. DEATH, COMMUNICATION AND THE EXPERIENCE OF LIMITS 
General economy for Bataille is the framework in which social phenomena can be 
analysed. He also seeks the inn er aspects of being ( examination of self). By way of 
exploring individual(s), he mainly emphasised inner experience and sovereign 
operation. In Bataille's book 'Eroticism', work and sexuality converge on each other 
at the heart of social that is strictly linked to our understanding of death. 
For Bataille, human experience is an experience of limits and these limits are defıned 
by the fact that the condition of life for human beings is the recognition of death. In 
order for life to become complex it imposes limits on itself. It needs death (may be 
only negation in the name of death). Life requires separation in order to develop. 
Meanwhile, it needs sexual difference. Through one's death the continuity of life 
process is af.fırmed. Therefore life emerges from death which is its condition and 
foundation. Life creates death for its own purposes but it also remains the negation of 
death. In the final analysis, death and reproduction negate and affirm the process of 
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life. Hence, birth and death meet in the sexual act. Eroticism affirms life to the point 
of death. It also affınns life even in death. Death and sex bring with them a residue 
experienced even at a primitive level, for the loss of the continuity of being that had 
been the condition of scissiparity. It is anguish, for life asserts itself at the expense of 
the living being, which is caught in a double bind. It returns to ~ndifferentiation of 
continuous being and wishes to surpass its limits and unite with the othemess it fears 
even as it desires it, seeking to transcend the separation that exists between itself and 
the other. The motivation for such desire is that it will, in the process, overcome 
death and returo to continuity in higher a form. Through ditierentiation life creates 
our sense of other and instils such a separation from our own sources. One can not 
know other' s experience so no desire can transeenci this gap. As B ataille claimed "our 
existence is an exasperated attempt to complete being" (1988, 99). Anguish is 
therefore present in all sexualised living beings (because humans are aware of death, 
but animals have limited sense ). Their urge ( clothing themselves) to preserve 
becomes primal. 
lt seems paradoxical that we protect ourselves from death and welcome death. For 
Bataille, eroticism is a kin d of break; it is assenting to life even in death (or up to the 
point of death). In that sense, it undercuts our own sense of being. It calls inner life 
into play. In human consciousness, it is which what calls his being in question. Hence 
we are marked. In becoming aware of death human requires security and this needs 
.... 
work. Work in its turn needed to be protected from disorder. It became a 
" psychological necessity to rationalise work. This involved a collective erime that 
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founded a notian of guilt, which took effect in the human mind in an analogous way 
to the primal scene. Therefore taboos come to be erected as an essential protection for 
the structure of society. While he might agree that the taboo would take shape as an 
infantile fantasy in each generation, this does not mean that it is purely to be ascribed 
to a neurotic basis. He says, like Freud, primal scene took shape as an actual event 
that stands at the heart of human psychological reality. It is the very prodigality of 
life transferred into the human soul that makes taboos a necessity. Life annihilates 
what it has created. It can never be extemally imposed. The imposition of taboo 
implied at the same the need to transgress it. This was the time the world would be 
turned upside down and all that had been denied in the course of principle work was 
brought back to the social sphere. Transgression is an important part of taboo. 
Transgression completes and transcends it. Transgression obeyed its rules and 
implied the consciousness, never the absence, of limits. There is also subsidiary play 
between life instinct and the impulse for death which Bataille characterised this as a 
conflict between continuity and discontinuity, play between taboo and transgression. 
Deatlı is violence but it is at the same time communication. It is the consciousness of 
death that makes community a possibility. In its transgressive role, sexuality brings 
together both the awareness of death and the need for work and recognitio!l of deatlı. 
Our sensibility is tied to a lost continuity framed by our awareness of death. By 
destroying· the discontinuous being, death affırms the underlying continuity of being. 
Eroticism is life momentarily overflowing its limits, but these possibilities are framed 
by the realisation of death. Sexual act reveals death before us. Sexual act functions as 
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the mark of our intimate relation with nature, recognition of our own mortality and 
recognition of the discontinuity of our being. According to Bataille, eroticism cedes 
sovereignty by degrading itself to animal activity. Nevertheless, eroticism defines us 
completely (it does so) only in conjunction with i ts opposite, which is work. 
Social life needs to be regulated through the interplay of profane and sacred, so 
personal life too needs to be aware of the relation between taboo and transgression. 
The denial of this necessity is the denial of sacred. Bataille believes that this lies 
within the ideology of Christianity. According to Bataille, by way of having allowed 
ourselves to be bom and so turn from universal continuity, we are guilty. W e separate 
ourselves from nature (other), so this is may be essential to our nature. Christianity is 
not a religion. The religious sentiment is bom of man's need for communication. In 
denying this need for communication, Christianity denies religion. This reinforces the 
extent to which the taboo is affırmed at the expense of transgression. This requires a 
denial of death. Therefore Christianity neutralises transgression. Eroticism lies in the 
heart of sacred. It represents both a mediation point between ourselves and the forces 
of nature and at the same time both differentiates as well as emphasising our essential 
unity. The sexual act must be equated with sacrifıce. He never rejects Christianity but 
he gives rise to the going beyond it. 'Hyper-Christianity' which would give meaning 
to the experience of life as it was really lived (Richardson 1994, 115). This is what 
Bataille calls 'atheology' (1988, 32). 
Inner experience in Bataille, which Richardson criticises, can recognise heterogeneity 
in so far as it can reduce it to the level of a thing. It serves the purposes of self-
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knowledge. Because Bataille's experience remaıns an individual encounter not 
consisting of collectivity. Is it not clear that the experience of sacrifice must be 
impossible in contemporary societies, since everything we know about sacrificial 
practices suggests that it was entirely free from any sense of individual guilt- the guilt 
of which it was the expression was undoubtedly collective? S~crifice can not be 
experienced in individual terms, and so it would seem to follow that the frame 
established by westem individualism would make the experience an essentially alien 
one for us. How can we recover the social frame that has been lost? 
There is not one experience (universal) of sacrifice but the essence(s). In this respect, 
the sacrificial experience appears inseparable from its form and can only be 
experienced within the social context in which it takes place. lt needs complicity for 
Sade, there is no relation between life and death, and there is only life and non-life. 
Death in this sense do es not exist ( everything was possible and there were no limits 
for Sade's position- absolute relativism), so there is no universal for him. Only by 
such bursting of limits would sovereignty become possible. Sade denies the notion of 
othemess and the possibility of communication. It is a profound affirmation of the 
world in which transcendence and hope are emphatically denied. 
Is it possible, as Bataille advocates, living entirely in the moment? How can one 
renounce concem for the future without renouncing life itself? Is it not life always 
defined by a "concem for the next moment? Bataille writes, "if we live sovereignly, 
the representation of deathis impossible, for the present is not subject to the demands 
of the future"(l988, 21 9). Richardson says, "yet, if this is so is it not a denial of life 
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itself, since Bataille has told us quite categorically that death is the condition of 
life"(1994, 122). 
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CHAPTER3 
3. SURREALISM 
Some critics claim that surrealism can be defined as an altemative to 'realism'. In 
fact, surrealism interrogated the legality and the scopes of the notion of 'real'. In 
realism, the opposition between nature and human is prior to every construction. In a 
way this is both presupposed in the history of art as intrinsic to art history and 
preserved as an absolute category in life. Hence, surrealism isa 'project' which aims 
to show the inconsistency of the category of 'real' as an absolute construction. In this 
respect, surrealism is not an altemative to realism, but a reaction to it. 
Surrealist work can be regarded as a shifting terrain of representation that constantly 
uses difference to generate meaning. The desired effect was to reveal the unconscious 
ın representation, and to undo prevalent conceptions of order and reality. Not only a 
matter of questioning reality but also how reality was normally represented. The state 
of ambiguity is the condition imposed on the spectator's reading of images. There 
had to be flow in reading of an image, so looking at image is to move from fragment 
to fragment,~ach clue displaced by a further one. 
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Breton' s idea of surrealism with the fırst surrealist manifestation in 1924 consisted of 
a 'complete state of distraction' that aims to make desires manifest (Fer 1993, 173). 
There was a refusal to recognise the utility or supposed rationality of the mass-
produced objects defıning the logic of the rational mind and to express a deeper sort 
of logic, that of unconscious in Meret Oppenheim's, Man Ray'~ and Masson's art 
works. All of them were also a strategy to attempt to work 'from the point of view' 
of the unconscious (Fer 1993, 69-71 ). The usage of unconsciousness in Surrealism 
depends on the fact that young surrealists were exposed to psychoanalytical 
categories. The French reception of Freud was also very crucial for surrealism 
although there was no strict theoretical proximity between Breton and Freud. Hal 
Foster in his book 'Compulsive Beauty' claims, 
"They differed on the value of hypnosis: whereas surrealism began with 
bypnotic sessions, psychoanalysis commenced with the abandonment of 
hypnosis. So, too, they disagreed on the nature of dreams. While Breton saw 
them as portents of desire, Freud read them as ambiguous fulfılments of 
conflictual wishes. For Breton dreams and reality were vases communicants, 
and surrealism was pledged to this mystical communication; for Freud the two 
were in a relation of distorted displacement, and the very antirationality of 
surrealism on this score made it suspect. Finally, they differed on questions of 
art. Freud regarded art as a process of sublimation, not a project of 
desublimation, as a negotiation of instinctual renunciation, not a transgression 
of cultural prohibition"(1993, 2-3) . 
... 
Lastly, especially Breton developed a concept of unconscious different from the 
Freudian concept of the unconscious, a remove from Freudian models of conflictual 
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forces. Unconsciousness is based on an originary unity rather than primal repression. 
This surrealism, an essentially Bretonian one, defines surrealism as 'psychic 
automatism'. This style, as it is explained by Rosalind Krauss in 'L' Amour Fou', can 
be disclosed as 'privileged visuality'. According to Krauss, 
"Breton had located his own invention of psychic automatism within the 
experience of hypnogogic images-that is, of half waking, half-dreaming visual 
experience. For it was out of the priority that he wanted to give to this sensory 
mode-the very medium of dream experience- that he thought he could institute 
a pictorial style"(l985, 20). 
Freud's terminology is in this respect a little bit different because for him, any 
attempt deliberately to contrive the effects of the uncouscious mind was a 
contradiction. But in the cultural context in which the su.rrealists worked, the most 
effective strategy available to them appeared to be to speak from the position of the 
irrational, to attempt to speak of madness from the place of madness itself rather than 
from the point of view of reason. 
The most literal way in which the surrealists used many Freudian motifs. However, 
as it was not only motifs that Surrealism took from Freud, but more importantly "a 
poetic sense of the mechanisms involved in the dreaming process" (Fer 1993, 180). 
Dream work was crucial for the Surrealist approach. Dreams unlocked the 
unconscious in a way not possible in waking life- as did connected phenomena suclı 
.., 
as day dreams, slips of tongue, and memory lapses. They (especially Breton) were 
interested in these areas because they were in pursuit of what Breton called "the 
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arbitrary to the highest degree" (1924, 38). The Surrealists searched for the 
mechanisms at work in the unconscious. They looked inside themselves for what was 
infantile. But they also sought to explore the memory lapses, the repressions of a 
whole culture; they looked back to the past, or to earlier myths, to question the 
present and imagine their way out of present conditions- as a means to transgress 
established boundaries of representation. The surrealist use of psychoanalysis cannot 
be separated from their social project. So, the transgression envisaged in Surrealism 
requires the integrity ofpsychic and sociaL In that sense, Marx's diagnoses of the ills 
of capitalism and Freud's diagnosis of the ills of patriarchy come together in 
Surrealism. Freud and Marx argue that relations between people or between social 
groups were veiled and hidden by what was normally accepted as reality. They 
criticised social structures and oppressive, sovereign culture. In that sense, the 
surrealist project was a critica! conjuncture of the psychic and the social. 
3.1. BRETON'S NADJA 
Breton's most famous book 'Nadja', written m 1928, had a strong impact on 
Surrealism. Breton, with 'Nadja', refers back to the Surrealists' fundamental 
scepticism about the kind of freedam possible under present conditions. 
The understanding of 'flaneur', which is a compulsive abserver of modem life, had 
been for Baudlaire distracted and fragmented by the experience of modem life. 
Breton's 'Nadja' is engaged in activity of a 'flaneur'. Nadja is also a compulsive 
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abserver who walks around the Paris aimlessly. Briony Fer quoting Breton says " 
'ever while I am close to her, I am closer to the things which are close to her'-
becomes a sign for these shifts of places and things"( 1993, 183 ). Intimacy is always 
mediated, for Breton, by the city itself-on which he focuses attention. He says, " It 
seems to me that I observe her too much, but how could I do otJıerwise"(Fer 1993, 
183). In Breton's book, desire that is the main subject of the book is tied up with 
looking and observing. It also involves submission -to danger or to endless 
possibility. 
For Breton, desire is necessarily elusive and distracted. The object being pursued 
becomes, for Breton, almost secondary to the pursuit itself. The pursuit not of an 
essence but of distraction. The pursuit could bring into play 'every artifıce' and it 
could enable an escape from the ordinary into a marvellous dazed state; the fleeting 
moments that he experienced with 'Nadja'. 
Another ofBreton's aims is to posit reader as 'flaneur' although he does not use the 
term. The reader watches Breton's fragmented narrative. Nadja and city are dealt 
with as the traces of Breton. The fantasy, then, was not only about femininity, but 
also about men's desires and masculinity. The flaneur needed to be in control of the 
gaze, since gazing, was one of the characteristic activities of the flaneur. This meant 
having possession of the gaze rather than being the object of it. Nadja accepted men's 
compliments"with pleasure and gratitude. A further part of Breton's fantasy is that 
this receptiveness gives her a power over men. In fact, Breton aimed to control 
Nadja-flaneur before she left the city. The Nadja ofBreton's text may be a projectian 
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of his own faltering identity, where he consistently fails to focus on the woman and 
instead displaces his attention onto the objects around her. 
Breton's essay on 'Gradiva' centred on the theme of metamorphosis, from life into 
death, unconscious to consciousness- on the idea of a transition from one thing to 
another, ie-the condition of metaphor that preoccupied Surrealism. The surrealists 
were interested in Freud' s analysis, especially of repressed desire, the role of dreams 
and with the unconscious workings of the mind. Breton projected some Freudian 
themes in Gradiva's two-fold character and in the precarious state of ambiguity 
between the muse and the 'real' woman. For Freud, both science and art could both 
reveal unconscious processes and shed light on the workings of the unconscious. So, 
Gradiva was the metaphor for surrealist avant-garde. Here, we fınd a calculated 
reversal of available models of modemity. An ancient relief is, for example, taken as 
a sign for cultural advancement. Nadja for Breton was the reminiscence, " I am the 
wandering soul", and the theme of the woman as the artist's muse (Fer 1993, 183). 
There is a problematic in surrealism. There is a distinction between the woman as 
muse and the woman as artist. As much as it celebrates the fusion of the muse with 
the woman, the Gradiva myth also points to an unsolved problem for surrealism. One 
can claim that Surrealism considered the question of sexuality without the aim of 
psychoanalysis. In that sense, as some feminists claimed, surrealism failed to express 
sexuality. As Briony Fer claimed, the sociological theories of sexuality can be 
" 
insuffıcient in explaining how certain patterns of behaviour, certain names and 
attitudes are intemalised by human beings. 
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3.2. BATAILLE AND BRETON 
In many respects, one can claim that the issues raised in surrealism were related to 
the nature of freedom. The surrealists were soon faced with a paradoxical truth that if 
it is to be realised, liberty has need of a moral basis. Bataille' s insistence on a 
collective truth, if it is recognised directly, was crucial in the development of 
surrealist way of thinking. For Bataille, a poet or a painter does not have a power to 
say what is in his heart, but an organisation or a collective body could. 
It seems likely that Bataille was drawn closer to surrealism after the war by his friend 
Michel Fardoulis-Lagrange, animating the journal 'Troisieme convoi', of which fıve 
issues were published between 1945 and 1952 and in which Bataille published three 
articles. The fırst of these texts is particularly signifıcant, for it signals the change in 
Bataille's perception and the fact that he believed the reappraisal of surrealism had 
become necessary. Describing himselfas 'surrealism's old enemy from within', he 
remains highly critical of surrealist practice, which he views as being too concemed 
with a place in the world: " he considers that with its books on the shelves and its 
paintings on the walls, a great surrealism begins" (Bataille 1994, 6). Bataille argues 
that such 'great surrealism' suggests that surrealism has lost its vigour and 
surrendered to the necessities of utilitarian society. 
In fact, Bataijle's reaction to surrealism can sometimes be related to his relationship 
to Breton. Michael Richardson defınes this as a complicated love-hate relationship. 
Although the debate between Breton and Bataille seems to be extrinsic to surrealism, 
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one can claim that the conflict arising between them is inherent to surrealism that is 
the content of 'sur' or the question of surrealism, its limits and realisation, which is 
resisted. According to Richardson, "where Breton's writing is crystalline and lyrical, 
reflecting the light and transparency with whose hope he would like to imbue the 
world, Bataille's writing is marked by a dark humour in which any notion ofhope is 
absent"(1994, 5). In the fırst Manifesto, Bataille and Breton disagreed on many 
different topics. Nonetheless, Bataille's criticism was crucial: 
"The dialectic between revolt and conservatism, between excess anda need 
for restraint. This is preliminary to his discussion of the relation between taboo 
and transgression in Eroticism, but it also identifıes the importance of what one 
can see as a deeply conservative strain within surrealism itself "(Richardson 
1994, 9). 
Bataille and Breton had completely different attitudes in the fırst Manifesto. 
Although an ambiguous incompatibility had been appeared in their discourses, they 
shared the same ideology in many respects. For instance, Bataille and Breton had 
relations with communist party in France. Actually, the connection between 
surrealism and Marxism was not coincidentai. For this reason, like Breton, Bataille 
was also aware of the need for communism in order to realise surrealism' s way of 
thinking. In fact, following the second Manifesto, a certain kind of problem came to 
the fore. For Breton, the main concem in the political domain had been a fraught 
collaboratioll'with the French Communist Party, which by 1935 was over, brought to 
a defınitive end with surrealist' tract 'On the Time the Surrealists were Right'. 
Despite the unhappy outcome of the relationship between surrealism and 
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Communism, it would be erroneous to see the conflict between them as inevitable, 
and any collaboration as being doomed from the start. Almost all surrealists had seen 
the necessity for some form of collaboration with Communism, and they were not 
naive in the realm ofpolitical theory. 
After the groupings of 'Contre-Attaque', 'Acephale' and the 'College of Sociology', 
with the outbreak of war in 1939 and Breton's exile in the USA, surrealists who 
continued to be active in Paris remained interested in Bataille, sending him their 
questionnaire on poetry, to which he replied. But in 1943 after the publication of 
'The Inner Expen·ence', they issued a violent tract, 'Nom de Dieu ', which recalls 
Bataille own attack on Breton fourteen years earlier. This time it is Bataille who is 
accused of mysticism, idealism and wanting to be a priest. 
Following Breton's returo and constitution of a wider based group, Bataille's attitude 
was transformed from dismissal to active involvement, to the extent of participating 
in the 1947 exhibition and contributing the important text 'The Absence of Myth' to 
the catalogue. This text defined one of Bataille's central preoccupations, soınetbing 
which linked him closely with surrealists, and especially with Breton's own current 
preoccupations (the theme of the exhibition itself was 'myth'). Bataille's interest in 
myth had developed in the Iate 1930 through Acephale and the College of Sociology, 
both of which were based en investigations that would try to reinvigorate myth in 
contemporary society. In early 1940s Bataille was trying to justify myth as a ground 
for society but he totally rejected the meaning of myth in contemporary world. For 
him, myth as mediation between mankind and natural world can not be accepted 
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although the place of myth in society is necessary. Bataille argues that the myth of 
contemporary society is an absence of myth, since that society deluded itself into 
believing it was without myth by making a myth of its denial. Both Bataille and the 
Surrealists claimed that contemporary society was in need of mythical foundation, 
but denying that fact it was simply making a fetish of its absence '!nd denying part of 
itself. Surrealists immediately noticed the uselessness of reviving ancient myths. 
Instead, like Bataille, they concentrated on the concept of its absence. Although they 
shared the same outcome, Bataille argued that this absence of myth was merely one 
aspect of a more generalised absence. It also means the 'absence of sacred' for 
Bataille. By defınition the sacred was defıned for him as 'communication'. Hence, its 
loss is an absence of communication. Quite simply, the notion of absence of myth 
meant a failure of communication which touched all levels of society. Therefore, a 
society, which ceases to communicate ceases to be a society, more specifıcally 
becomes an absence ofcommunity. 
Surrealists' analysis of myth (the absence of myth) touches Marxİst notion of 
alienation. Bataille, myth appropriates reality, such a concept destroys the nature of 
myth. According to Bataille, everything about the concept of reality is mythical. 
Bataille's basic criticism lies in the solid understanding of society. Surrealism does 
not deny the 'primitive'; rather it looks back to the past in order to recreate it. For 
Bataille, it is necessary to recreate the notion of ritual in a society within which the 
.... 
value of it represented (the value of community) has been destroyed by Christianity, 
which had been the basis for Capitalism. The problem of surrealism is that there is no 
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possibility of imbuing any such ritual with meaning. No ritual, for Bataille, can go 
beyond the immediate context of i ts performan ce. This is contagious nature of ri tual. 
Like capitalism, surrealism also makes a fetish of ritual. In that way, they make ritual 
absolute. This tragic outcome is, may be, the power of industrial culture, everything 
become part of the very absence of myth they sought to co~front. One of the 
solutions, the most crucial one, surrealists emphasised is the moral status of 
community. Actually, they were thinking that if it is established a new way of 
community not based upon the principle of individualism, the true nature of myth 
could be achieved. That was, of course, Communism. "The surrealists had made 
revolt a moral value, calling themselves ' specialists in revolt' and Bataille was later 
to define surrealism as a state of rage"(Rishardson 1994, 24). This served to 
emphasise its relation to his own thought, and served especially to provide a 
preliminary definition for what would become one of Bataille's central precepts, the 
notion of sovereignty. 
This notion was paraUel to Breton's supreme point in the second manifesto. With this 
notion of sovereignty and its realisation, an individual becomes free of given 
conditions without transcending society. It was a state characterised as impossible. 
This impossibility is directly connected to fundamental paradox of existence in which 
the highest aim is the resolution of w hat can not be resolved. Unlike Sade' s notion of 
sovereignty, Bataille's notion welcomes death. Sade's work çan be accepted as an 
affirmation that denies death. Bataille's own statement that eroticism is the assenting 
to life even in death, but he does not deny death. Eroticism is very crucial for 
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Bataille. What is at stake in sex is communication between two beings, and pushing 
sexuality to its limits, he wants to test to breaking point the emotional boundaries of 
the personality of the man and the woman. This point of undifferentiation causes 
anguish in which their separate identities disappear. Sade totally rejects this 
conclusion, because an identity is not what he wanted. For ~ade, an individual 
acquires his/her sovereign power in the end of extreme experiences. 
For Bataille, the more othemess is denied, the more sexuality is reduced to a 
m ec hanical act. Bataille' s postulation of the other always refers to his un derstanding 
of 'death'. He affırms that 'life in its plenitude includes death' (Richardson 1994, 
16). Ina way, Bataille reminds us that ifwe don't become aware of the basic need for 
communication that lies in human activities, which is the basic principle for 
socialisation for Bataille, we cannot be free. Bataille with his understanding of the 
other or with the consciousness of death in life implies the notion of mediation, as in 
Hegel's dialectic, necessary for liberty. The condition of liberty is the recognition of 
its limits. Again, quite opposite from Sade's positjon, denying the limits or trying to 
break completely free from them is to deny one's own humanity. Bataille 
distinguishes his own 'philosophy' from Sade and Breton's in all these topics which 
have been mentioned above. In fact, the point Bataille wants to come is to show the 
necessity of 'work'. Only with work is transgression possible and one can only 
transgress the limits by being aware of the limits which encloses 'man'. 
Some of surrealists accused Bataille of mysticism. According to Dennis Hollier, this 
term 'mystical' is misconceived in the characterisation of Bataille. The confusion 
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arıses because Bataille' s primary concem ıs with communication. But such 
communication cannot be a beyond, as is the case of mysticism. For Bataille, it is 
conceptually impossible to know or communicate with what is beyond death, since 
death is an absolute limit of human experience. In introduction to 'The Absence of 
Myth' Richardson claims, 
"The most one can experience is the vertigo of the edge of chasm. This is the 
point at which the erotic and the mystical experience meet, but contrary to the 
aim of mysticism. Bataille believed that it was impossible to experience the fall 
itself without actually falling"( 1994, 18). 
It seems accurate to say that Sade was materialist, because a consistent materialism 
cannot adınit death. None of Sade's heroes really fears death. In that sense, Sade's 
materialism is directly connected with his atheism. On the other hand, one can claim 
that Bataille's concept of othemess welcomes 'idealism'. Like Sade, Bataille desires 
consecration in action but this does not satisfy him. Here, the problemishow to place 
thought in our essential beings. Believing that we can live in accordance with our 
passions is an empty nostalgia for Bataille. From that respect, may be we can replace 
his idealism, his understanding of death as othemess and his notion of 
undifferentiation in his materialism and in a consistent materialism, the material only 
takes form with respect to the mental (and vice versa). In that manner, it seems 
Bataille's thought is remarkably close to that of Breton. Surrealists' way of using 
Sade's ideas ts established on the light of Bataille's criticism of Sade. Therefore, the 
very basis of Surrealism is social. 
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Although Bataille traces the unifying elements between individual and society, he 
claims that unity of the world is a hidden unity, on which surrealists insisted. 
Richardson claims that "in positing an 'absence of myth', Bataille was looking not 
for a new form of mysticism, but to reintegrate the notion of ecstasy into the body 
social, within which it would have a virulent and contagious quality"(1994, 21). The 
same thing is true for surrealists but surrealists recognise this as an intolerable 
situation, and the urge of surrealism is to overcome the isolation it implies. This is 
why it needs communism, since in communism the urge towards a society that is not 
based on the needs of personal interests. In fact, communism constructed i ts identity 
by denying the needs of personal interests although it needs them in order to establish 
itself. This is the tragedy of Communism in practice. Although communism had 
some problemsin practice, it embodies the principle more powerfully than surrealism 
ever could. In other words, the re invigoration of myth for which surrealism called 
could take shape only through Communism. 
3.3. BATAILLE'S FORMLESS 
In Surrealism there were two uses of Freud and his theory, two point of views for 
literature in relation to psychoanalysis each of which may be represented by Bataille 
and Breton. Breton attempted to negate the distinction between normality and 
pathology (man is still free to believe freedom -there is always residual hope for 
.... 
him-beauty). Bataille had quite different ideas from Breton. He proposed a real 
practice of imbalance, a real risk to mental health. He refused to entertain available 
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images of liberation preferring to participate in i ts trauma, to engage in baseness with 
no claim for objective distance. For him illumination is fall from grace: beauty which 
is only in the moment of obsolescence linked with decay and death. 
According to Bataille baseness is which triggers rot and decay- the characteristic 
processes of the formless, or the process by which form is 'undone'. Fer argues that 
in Documents the words he selected for defınition such as mouth and eyes are 
sketched in a way that stops the words being fıxed in their meanings (1993, 206). 
They follow the form of a dictionary, but undo that form at the same time. That is, 
the words are displaced from any absolute definition and are further displaced by the 
images. Many ofBataille's terrus in the dictionary and elsewhere refer to parts ofthe 
body asa dismembered anatomy of the modem. Bataille shared Sade' s importance, 
but stressed his 'fleeing for the terrible', the violence and cruelty of his writing (Fer 
1993, 208). In his view of modem art Bataille intemalised Sadean principles. Miro's 
work, for example-which decomposed the image and broke up its unity-was, like 
Dali's, indicative of the principle of destruction at work in modem art. Fer following 
Bataille's arguments claims, 
"Modem art began with Manet because he was the fırst to 'destroy' the 
subject of painting. With Manet began the obliteration of 'text'- that is, the 
story that might have been the painting's pretext. In the case of 'Olympia', the 
'text' of prostitution is repudiated or cancelled out by Manet's handling, 
.... 
making the 'text' and the painting 'part company': the picture abiiterates the 
text, wrote Bataille, and the meaning of the picture is not in the text behind it 
but in the 'obliteration' ofthat text"(1993, 209). 
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Breton represents unity ın comparison with Bataille's sense of disunity or 
decenteredness. Bataille simply represents surrealism without politics as opposed to 
Breton's revolutionary credentials. Surrealism, itself many-faceted, has become asite 
of conflicting accounts of what the modem means. Breton's model of Surrealism 
engages directly with revolutionary politics and has been influen!ial in attacking the 
view that art can be autonomous from social and political concems. Bataille's ideas 
no more asserted a independence for art or culture than did Breton's, nor idealised art 
as free from politics. Utopian fervour, all hope for liberation, is turned in an itself in 
a terminable state of trauma. For Bataille, if psychic disorder was to be merely 
imitated- even as a mode of critique- all was lost. In this respect, madness and 
hysteria are not pathological but rather supreme forms of expression and that 
provides breaking down of repressive laws. May be this can be characterised by the 
subversion of the relations between subject and the world of morality outside of any 
system of delirium. This is an unconscious protest (perhaps the feminine protest 
against the law of the father). 
Freud's theory lies partly at least in his analysis of how sexual difference is not a 
biological given but is made in culture. So the symbolic is important for Freud where 
the law of the father stands metaphorically for the doruination of men over women. 
May be sexual difference is made in culture not in nature. Hysteria from this respect 
can be seen as failed masquerade. 
For Breton aesthetic response is integrally tied to an experience of erotic pleasure. 
According to him, there are three elements of convulsive beauty: veiled erotic which 
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is the process of representation at work in nature; one animal imitates another, a 
deliriuro which shows that aesthetic can not be revealed by normal channels and the 
freezİng of the wild mavement of something. 
Like hysteria, paranoıa also (as Lacan claims) entered the surrealist aesthetic, 
through Dali in particular: the idea that one thing simultaneously can be read as 
another while never loosing its original identity entirely. The fıguration can 
theoretically and practically be multiplied. Dali developed his own paranoic-critical 
method in painting. For Surrealists, the idea of object as fetish could be used by the 
artists. F er says, 
"This is not to suggest that the appeal of fetish was as a universal, 
transcendent category, but that it lay in the sorts of mechanism and process that 
were in the idea of the fetish. In Freud's view the fetish is always a substitute 
for something else, and in surrealism's terms is an obsessional object. But we 
should bear in mind the point made earlier, that it is the sight of the object, the 
process of fıxation, which also establishes one thing asa fetish for another. An 
object or image may be repeatedly used to show this obsessional aspect or, 
equally signifıcant, the emphasis may be on the angle of the look"(1993, 227). 
The idea of the angled look, that isolates the image from its familiar context, was 
characteristic of surrealist photography (Man Ray's photographs, 1933, Calleetion 
Resabianca Skira). 
Surrealism was nurtured by Marx (commodity fetishism) and Freud (fetishism). 
Commodity fetishism deseribed the ritualistic value that is ascribed to such goods 
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because of their exchange or monetary value. For Marx, value is given to things 
rather than people. In this context, the actual use value of goods recedes into the 
background and all commodities act symbolically as social hieroglyphs. This extends 
to social life in general. For the surrealists, the art object as fetish tended to reify 
desire-to convert it into a ritual object of exchange, like any ~other commodity-
through the process of displacement. In the fetish, the social and psychic could meet. 
The surrealist object might even be seen to call into question where the real fetishism 
of modem culture lay. 
For Bataille, it was not only a matter of redefining and reascribing use and symbolic 
value to objects, but precisely that the full force of the fetish was lacking in 
surrealism. Bataille wrote " I defy any amateur of paintings to love a canvas as m uc h 
as a fetishist loves a shoe"(Bataille quoted in Fer 1993, 231 ). 
3.4. CRIME AND ART 
The surrealists conceived erime as the revelation of a real nature passessed by all 
human beings. They also saw erime as a subversive and hence affirmative gesture 
that demolisbed rather than confirmed or erected hierarchies between the great and 
the ordinary. The surrealists thus celebrated and defended famous criminals, 
including the Papin sisters, because they saw them as victims. As Carolyn J. Dean 
.... 
put it, "surrealists did not conceive crimes as testimony to eriminals distance from 
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humanity, as expressions of reserve or alienation, but rather (as they had with Sade) 
to their humanness"(1992, 210). 
The surrealist writers sought through art to recover the hidden, repressed criminal or 
other in theruself and in the world. They used convulsion and automatic writing as 
the aesthetic techniques for revealing this repressed other. Breton says in Nadja, " 
Beauty will be convulsive or not be at al1"(1928, 160). Hence, they saw erime as the 
transgression of taboos, the release of a desire that, as they saw it, constituted the 
origin of art. Through art the ereatar returned to something once lost. Therefore it 
represents the recovery of a truth. In this manner, the relation between art and erime 
becomes imperceptible. Art becomes erime and vice versa. Dean says, 
';Surrealist writers, thus, eroticised art by merging it with violence and they 
reconccived it as the product of a libidinal, primarily sadomasochistic drive that 
metamorphosed everyday objects, especially the human body. The violent and 
sensual image of the convulsion was thus central to surrealist method. It was 
not always literally erotic but its origins were libidinal; it represented a 
metaphorical lovemaking that shocks, startles, and wrenches apart what Breton 
called ready-made realities" (1992, 214). 
It can be said that surrealism transforrus decomposed images into new language. In 
fact the techniques they used was for this possibility of a new language. In this 
respect the art produced by automatic writing seeks to go beyond the material 
boundaries of literary form. 
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Bataille saw erime differently from surrealists. He claims that erime hides itself and 
that which escapes us is the most horrible. In this respect surrealist project hid erime 
by means of daiming that surrealism may totally reveal the hidden nature of erime. 
But Bataille both hides and proclaims it. Therefore he uses erime as a metaphor for 
literary production. For Bataille surrealism turned erime into art._ at the expanse of 
erime itself. 
Bataille' s criticism of erime is connected to his analysis of fascist power in relation to 
the heterogeneous forces of human life. Dean claims that "heterogenous forces 
defıned, heterogeneous as unproductive expenditure, as a force that exists for itself' 
(1992, 228-30). Fascism uses powerful symbolic rituals both to mobilise the masses 
and to ground i ts authority. In this respect for Bataille fascism denies itself by means 
of drawing its force from the effective dimension of human existence which 
characterised primitive societies and their symbolic structures. Therefore, it takes its 
force from bourgeoisie's own repressed material. Hence, its force coınes from this 
unconscious. Bataille was interested in fascism because it confırmed his belief in the 
transgressive and bence revolutionary quality of self-loss. For Bataille, Dean claims, 
fachists 
" ... transcend themselves by identifying with the sacrifıcial victim. They 
experience an essentially vicarious death, self-loss, and bence oneness with the 
community. The spectacle is a simulation of self-loss which feels real, a 
... 
mimetic reproduction of an experience that can be experienced only through an 
imaginary identifıcation with the victim. In this sense, surfascisme as strategy 
represented an effort to challenge fascism with an organic antifascist movement 
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to which Bataille and other antifascist intellectuals subscribed as an altemative 
to Soviet-style communism"(1992, 229). 
Bataille thinks that surfascisme would permit the self-transgression and affırmation 
of community characteristics of fascist movements without degenerating into real 
murder. Therefore, surfascisme takes in the self-destructive erasur.e of the boundaries 
between self and other. Thus for Bataille, the heterogeneous or other can be rendered 
only as art, as spectacle. Nevertheless, Bataille reintegrates art into the body in order 
to create heterogeneity. Therefore, art is organİsed around the sacrifıcial ceremonies 
and rituals. 
In Bataille, writing no longer represents the sublimated other: it symbolizes an other, 
an unconscious, that can not be symbolized, that is always already written. In that 
sense Bataille constructs other as different from surrealists. Breton sees a way out 
from ordinary discourse in which art has a specifıc place in order to construct a new 
language. In this project, Breton defınes or substitutes other as a way to heaven, so 
automatic writing and convulsi ve beauty are the methods for achieving this aim. On 
the other hand, Bataille took the surrealists conflation of prohibition and 
transgression, of the self and the criminal other, as a starting point from which to 
draw new boundaries. For Bataille, "manhood is the impossibility of ever being a 
whole man"(l992, 243) . 
.... 
Although both Bataille and Breton place pleasure at the centre of their projects, 
Bataille's pleasure has no reference other than the repression that constitutes it. The 
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criminal, sadistic father, Van Gogh were not metaphors for our deeper or other being 
for Bataille, as they had been for surrealists. They were metaphors for an othemess 
that had ceased to be referential, that was always already symbolised. For Bataille, 
self is always already split. Self is only caught up in mobility in which the 
transgression of limits and boundaries are at work. This parado2'ical nature of the 
constitution of self in Bataille's discourse mainly depends on the supposition that 
desire is always linked to the repression that it is constituted by. Therefore, Battaille 
claims that one cannot transgress the limits and the boundaries without the law of 
transgression that constitutes transgression. In this respect, as Dean argued Bataille's 
formation ofselfis inseparable from "the love ofthe law"(1992, 247). 
The surrealists used criminality in order for rehabilitation and they constituted and 
constructed selfas other. Therefore, they theorised the selfas an other, at once fixed 
and eroded, explained and inexplicable, present and uncannily absent. Bataille, on the 
other hand, "tried to save the self by defıning the other (true or real) selfas an (now 
irretrievable) other" although he participated the renewal of self with surrealism 
(1992, 249). 
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CHAPTER4 
4. THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOVEREIGN OPERATION IN 
BATAILLE'S DISCOURSE 
4.1. NEGATION AS AFFIRMATION 
Following Bataille's own views, Bataille's confrontation with Hegel may be seen as 
central to his thought and writing. Bataille's reading of the lectures of Alexander 
Kojeve was very important in his encounter with Hegel. Viewing Kojeve, Bataille 
interpreted and modifıed the dialectic of master and slave. In this respect, the 
concepts of sovereignty and general economy were developed by Bataille through a 
reading ofHegel's narrative of master and slave. 
Bataille quotes from Kojeve, "the central and the fınal idea of Hegelian philosophy," 
which is " the idea that the foundation and the source of human objective reality 
(\Virklichkeit) and empirical existence (Dasein) are the Nothingness which manifests 
itselfas negative or creative Action, free and self-conscious"(Kojeve, 1947, quoted in 
Bataille, 1990, p.lO). The master and slave struggle in Hegel's philosophy can be 
.... 
read as an encounter of the two self-consciousnesses. Before the "fırst fıght", they do 
not have any certainty. Kojeve explains that" The beings that are separated from one 
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another are the master and slave who are created in and by the fırst fıght and who are 
essentially different from one another"(Kojeve, 1947, p.244). For Hegel, the 
difference between master and slave is created in and by this struggle. In master and 
slave dialectic each wants to destroy the other and each risks his life. This 
phenomenon is considered asa life and death struggle. One puts ope's life at stake in 
order to be recognised. By means of doing this one gains one's freedom. In that 
sense, in order to be an 'I' one needs to be recognised by another self-consciousness. 
Putting one's own life at stake is (to be) required for certainty. So, recognition in 
master and slave dialectic always necessitates mediation, because the truth of my own 
being is secondary. According to Hegel, the most important characteristic in 
distinguishing man from other existents is an act of desire. All men are animated by 
desire for recognition. 
For Kojeve, "the dialectical or anthropological philosophy of Hegel is in the fina] 
analysis a philosophy of death"(Kojeve, 1947, Bataille, 1990, p.10). In the meeting of 
two self-consciousnesses, the master does not fear death and risks his life, while the 
slave fears to do so and gives recognition to the one who does not fear death. In that 
struggle, slave transforms object and prepares it for master's consumption. The slave 
works on the object. The master becomes independent consciousness by way of the 
slave's recognition. Therefore, he who risks his life is the master. He puts his life at 
stake. Negativity is actualised through the negation ofbeing and this can be perceived 
in the following way: fırst of all, man must become conscious of being limited or 
being 'mortal' and then, he must risk his life in order to be a different existence from 
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others. So, a human distinguishes himself from others by means of negating his 
existence. Kojeve claims "man knows that he must die"(1947, 256). 
For Hegel, the history of relationships between men is the history in which master 
and slave have been effected, so they change themselves correspondingly. 
Nevertheless, the narrative of master and slave dialectic is not naively the narrative of 
the evolution of history; such m eaning and truth are also established in the system of 
Hegel. The negative relation between 'man-nature-man' determines the connection 
between man and the thing. This connection between man and nature prepares the 
ground of the emergence of the histoncal person. Thus, man distinguishes himself 
from thing by means of negation, so he gains his social ego. For Hegel man is a 
histoncal and free individual. Man can only be human within the dialectical process. 
Kojeve claims that " in this dialectical period, the totality of man consists of three 
major phenomena: Individuality, freedom and historicity" (1947, 254-255). For 
Hegei, these three major conditions are only grasped by a dialectic in which death is 
the appearance of negativity and actualised through the negation of being. This 
economy of life, in the fınal analysis, holds the totality of what is. Hegel says " 
Everything depends on one's expressing and understanding Truth not (only) as 
substance, but also as subject"(l977, 9-10). 
For Hegel, the dialectical being is necessarily temporal and fınite. This means that 
death alone assures the existence of a dialectical being. If death, or fear of death 
which is the basic mode of existence in master and slave struggle, did not dwell in 
man as the source of his anguish, there would be no man or liberty, no history or 
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individual. Bataille says " he is no longer, like a stone, an immutable given, he bears 
within him Negativity; and the force, the violence of negativity cast him into the 
incessant movement of history, which changes him and which alone realises the 
totality of the concrete real through time"(l990, ı2). In that framework, God cannot 
occupy a sovereign position. Rather, it is "Ithat is W e and W e tha! is I" (He gel 1977, 
ı ı O), i.e., the spirit of the sage (Hegel), that occupies a sovereign position as a 
regent. Bataille laughs at this conclusion and he argues that "this way of seeing things 
can with justice be considered comic"(Bataille, ı 990, p.13). Following Jacques 
Derrida's reading ofBataille, Bataille's concepts of sovereignty and general economy 
can be represented as a way of eliminating the truth of self-consciousness and work. 
In that sense, Bataille' s sovereign operation tries to put 'abstract negativity', pure and 
&imple death into work. Therefore, Bataille's general economy and his sovereign 
operation depend on "the experiences which all signify consumption of bodily energy 
outside the world of rational and useful produetivity: laughter, eroticism, sacrifıce, or 
the experience ofthe sacred, and poetic effusion"(Mutman ı995, ı88). 
Derrida claims that "a complicity withoui reserve accompanies Hegelian discourse, 
'takes it seriously' up to the end, without an objection in philosophical form, while, 
however, a certain burst of laughter exceeds it and destroys its sense, or signals, in 
any event, the extreme point of 'experience' which makes Hegelian discourse 
dislocate itself; and this can be done only through close scrutiny and full knowledge 
ofwhat one is laughing at"(1978, ı04). Bataille considers that sovereign operation, as 
an operation to put Hegel's abstract negativity into work, refers to the total risk of 
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meaning in which meaningless negativity is considered. In that manner, sovereign 
operation risks what the master neglected (abstract negativity) by employing it. 
Bataille's sovereign operation is thus in excess of dialectics which is the method of 
preserving what is transgressed. 
Hegel's notion of 'Aufhebung' plays an important role in the act of transgression. 
Hegel claimed the necessity of the master' s retaining the life that he exposes to risk. 
Without this economy of life, "the trial by death, however, cancels both the truth 
which was to result· from it, and therewith the certainty of self together"(Hegel, ı 977, 
quoted in Derrida, ı 978, p. 1 06). Thus, the truth of life is grasped by the ruse of 
reason in which an essential life that is combined to the fırst one making it work for 
the constitution of self-consciousness, truth and meaning. Everything covered by the 
name lordship is guaranteed in dialectic by Hegel's notion of the Aufhebung. As 
Derrida puts it, Bataille laughs at this victory of life. Laughter alone exceeds 
dialectic, because Bataille pushes the negative to such an extreme that it is not 
possible for it to produce truth and absolute meaning. "It burst out only on the basis 
of an absolute renunciation of meaning, an absolute risking of death, what Hegel calls 
'abstract negativity' "(Derrida, ı 978, ı 07). 
While the truth in Hegellinks to itself, in sovereign operation it links to its other. The 
sovereign's failure, as Derrida put it, is the absolute loss of meaning, but as Hegel 
said, soverei~n operation also needs life in order to be in relation to itself. So, it must 
simulate the absolute risk in order to weld natural and sovereign lives together. While 
Aufhebung leaves nothing behind because it wastes nothing and profıts from 
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everything, sovereign operation considers what is left behind, with the excess which 
the Aufhebung excludes because it cannot profit from it. Hence, sovereign operation 
ceases to be a dialectic of the master and slave dialectic and it opens Bataille's text to 
general economy that is place of sacrifice, the domain of loss and consumption. 
"The privileged manifestation of Negativity is death, but death, ın fact, 
reveals nothing. In theory, it is his natural, animal being whose death reveals 
Man to himself, but the revelation never takes place. For when the animal being 
supporting him dies, the human being himself ceases to be. In order for Man to 
reveal himself ultimately himself, he would have to die, but he would have to 
do it whiie living-watching himself ceasing to be. In other words, death itself 
would have to become (self-) consciousness at the very moment that it 
annihilates the conscious being. In a sense, this is what takes place (what at 
least is on the point of taking place, or which takes place in a fugitive, 
ungraspable manner) by means of a subterfuge. In the sacrifıce, the sacrifıcer 
identifıes himself with the animal that is struck down dead. And so he dies in 
seeing himself die, and even, ina certain way, by his own will one in spirit with 
the sacrifıcial weapon. But it is a comedy"(Bataille, 1990, p.19). 
D~struction, suppression, death and sacrifice constitute a radİcal negativity without 
reserve. Such a negativity that is no longer determined in dialectic. In Hegel's system 
negativity is always connected to positivity, but sovereign operation, as a point of 
non-reserve, is neither positive nor negative. Derrida argues that with the term 
Aufhebung, Hegel uses negativity in order to reassure us of the other surface of the 
positive. So;-.it can no longer be called negative because "it can no longer permit 
itself to be converted into positivity, because it can no longer collaborate with the 
continuous linking-up of meaning, concept, time and truth in discourse; because it 
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literally can no longer labour and let itself be interrogated as the 'work of the 
negative' "(Derrida 1978, ll 1). 
The displacement of Hegel refers to the experience of the sacred and to eroticism and 
laughter in Bataille's form ofwriting. In fact, Bataille aims to undo the self-certainty 
in Hegel's discourse. For him, useless consumption such as eroticism and 1aughter 
refers to the general economy in which experience of the sacred fınds its proper 
place. In that manner, general economy exceeds the horizon of modern economy that 
is defıned with the principle of productivity. For Bataille, a general economy cannot 
totally be detached from a restricted economy, because these concepts are 
inseparable. W ith a new form of writing, writing of the sovereign, Bataille in ten ds to 
create a kind of experience which communicates with unknowledge. 
"Indeed, ifHegel's attitude opposes learned consciousness and the limitless 
organisation of a discursive thinking to the naivete of sacrifıce, stili that 
consciousness and that organisation remain unclear on one point; one can not 
say that Hegel was unaware of the 'moment' of sacrifıce; this moment is 
included, imp1icated in the who le movement of 'Phenomenology' _ where it is 
the Negativity of death, insofar as it is assumed, which makes a man of the 
human ani mal. But because he di d not see that sacrifice in itself bore witness to 
the entire movement of death, the fınal experience-the one to peculiar to the 
sage- deseribed in the Preface to the Phenomenology was at fırst initial and 
universal- he did not know what extent he was right-with what precision he 
deseribed the intimate movement ofnegativity "(Bataille 1990, 19) . 
.... 
Although there is a difference between Hegel and the man of sacrifıce, Derrida 
claims sovereignty does not escape dialectic. He says " it could not be said that it 
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extracts itself from dialectics like a morsel of dialectics which has suddenly become 
independent through a process of decision and tearing away"(Derrida, 1978, 1 12). 
Sovereignty is articulated to the economy of reason. It inscribes the dialectical 
synthesis and makes it function within the sacrifice of meaning. It does not suffice to 
risk death, rather death is the investment as the work of negative in sovereign 
operation. Bataille's operation can be considered asa linkage, which is only possible 
by the experience of the sacred, between knowledge and unknowledge. As Derrida 
put it, "sovereignty must still sacrifice lordship and, thus, the presentation of the 
meaning of death"(1978, 112). Bataille's failure essentially lies in the notion that 
sovereign operation is another discourse which gets around Hegel. In that sense, 
sovereign operation basically refers to the restricted economy, to the economy of 
Hegel. In this respect, sovereign operation, which attributes a meaning to the absence 
of meaning, is the desire for meaning. 
4.2. BATAILLE'S WRITING 
In speaking at the limit of silence, Bataille finds a way in order to reorganise silence 
of sovereign. For Bataille, silence is the condition for sovereign writing which 
exceeds the logic and the aim of Hegelian discourse. The difficulty in speaking of an 
absence of meaning and the impossibility of considering it without giving it a name 
underlies the urge for Bataille that the sovereign must be considered as impossible 
" 
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which is the repressed source for knowledge. Bataille argues "being is given to us as 
impossible"(1988, 89). 
Bataille shows that in order for one to have transgressed articulated knowledge, one 
needs to ruin discontinuity and remain foreign to difference as the source of 
signifıcation. The possibility of erasing discontinuity and the necessity of continuity 
lies in communication. This communication is not the one that is affırmed by 
metaphysics, rather it requires "beings who have put the being within themselves at 
stake, have placed it at the limit of death, ofnothingness"(Bataille, 1988, P.283). This 
writing, writing of the sovereign, requires a certain sliding which aims to relate its 
syntax and its lexicon to a major silence. 
For Bataille, the sovereign operation must be related to scientific discourse. Differing 
from llegelian Lordship, it is attached to nothing and conserves nothing. This is not 
an easy task that directly makes itself connected to common syntax. "Like lordship, 
sovereignty makes itself independent through the putting at stake of life"(Derrida 
1978, 116). 
"At stake in the operation, therefore, is not a self-consciousness, an ability to 
be near oneself, to maintain and to watch oneself. We are not in the element of 
phenomenology. And this can be recognised in the primary characteristic-
illegible within philosophical logic- that sovereignty does not govern itself 
"(Derrida,..1978, p.ll6). 
As Derrida put it, sovereignty does not govern things and discourses. Nevertheless, 
this furious task is always at the core of dialectic. Bataille simulates llegelian 
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concepts in a way that shakes their secure ground and displaces their meaning. The 
identity of Bataille's sovereign which aims to simulate Hegelian concepts in order to 
fınd a real basis for knowledge requires the unity of knowledge with unknowledge. 
For Derrida, "sovereignty has no identity, is not self, for itself, toward itself, near 
itself "(Derrida, ı 978, p. ı ı 7). This difference between master an~ sovereign shows 
the way to sovereignty. Derrida claims that Bataille's sovereignty assigns a new form 
to writing that produces the trace as trace. According to Derrida, if it eludes presence 
and constitutes itself as the possibility of abso1ute erasure, it may be called trace. 
Hence, it is necessary for sovereign writing to erase the trace, because "unerasab1e 
trace is not a trace"(Derrida ı 978, 117). In this respect, Derrida reconstructs 
Bataille's form of writing with respect to his propositions on these two relations, 
minor and rnajor writing, to the trace. 
In minor writing, sovereıgn operation establishes a relationship with the seriİle 
writing in which reason is sacrifıced and the poetic is erased. These residues of the 
sacrifice of reason survive in the minor form of writing although sovereign operation 
defıes these residues. "The survival of that which is written is the survival of the 
mumıny"(Bataille ı988, ı04). Major form of writing implies the interruption of 
servile form of speech and meanjng. In these two forms of writing, sovereignty alone 
does not exceed the logic of lordship but the space of writing between major and 
min or form of writing perforrus the exceeding of the logos (of meaning, lordship, 
... 
presence ). Therefore, sovereignty as a concept is directly linked to the lordship, but 
only in writing and with the space of writing (major writing) can dialectic be 
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exceeded. As Derrida claimed "in order to maintain sovereignty, in order to lose it, in 
order still to reserve the possibility not of its meaning but of its non-meaning; in 
order to distinguish it", "we must fınd a speech which maintains silence"(Derrida 
1978, 114). 
The transgression of m eaning is not a path to the immediate; also it is not an access to 
the identity of non-meaning. Phenomenology reduces everything for the production 
of the meaning, but sovereign operation is the reduction of this reduction: "not a 
reduction to meaning, but a reduction ofmeaning"(Derrida 1978, 120). Nevertheless, 
this form of writing does not totally depend on the ageney of sovereignty. So, this 
form of writing exceeds sovereignty. One cannot fınd any fundamental or essential 
element in sovereignty that gives rise to the major form of writing. Therefore, 
sovereignty is not a condition of possibility. 
4.3. GENERAL ECONOMY 
For Bataille, general economy is the basis for the relation between the objects of 
thought and sovereign moments in which every object are related to the loss of 
meaning. In general economy, useless energy or excess of energy is put at stake. "It is 
this useless, senseless loss that is sovereignty"(Bataille quoted in Derrida 1978, 122). 
Derrida claims, 
"In so far as it is a scientific form of writing, general economy is certainly 
not sovereignty itself. Moreover, there is no sovereignty itself. Sovereignty 
dissolves the values of meaning, truth and a grasp-of-the-thing-itself. This is 
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why the discourse that it opens above all is not true, truthful or sincere. 
Sovereignty is the impossible, therefore it is not, it is -B ataille writes this word 
in italics-'this loss'. The writing of sovereignty places discourse in relation to 
absolute non-discourse. Like general economy, it is not the loss of meaning, 
but, as we have just read, the relation to this loss of meaning. It opens the 
question of meaning. It does not deseribe un-knowledge, for this is impossible, 
but only the effect of un-knowledge" ( 1978, 123 ). 
The writing of sovereign is not sovereignty in its operation, also it is not the 
scientific discourse. One can think of sovereign as a path to non-discourse, but one 
must not reduce it to a non-discourse, because it always manifests a relation to non-
discourse as in the case of general writing which has also meaning since it is only 
relation to non-meaning. "A moment that is only sketched in the poetic 
image"(Derrida 1978, 123). In a way, Derrida differentiates general writing from 
sovereignty. For him, sovereignty cannot be a substance for general writing. Bataille 
uses general economy for the sovereign writing. Thus, Bataille predicates general 
economy as 'super-essentiality'. For Derrida, this is central dileroma of discourse in 
Westem thought. 
Derrida claims that the concepts of general writing are not there in order to mean 
something or to oppose the concepts of restricted economies, rather general writing 
makes sense slide. Therefore, this form of writing does not produce new conceptual 
unities. The concepts of general writing are qualified only by metaphor. For Derrida, 
"this is the only way, within tbe discourse, to mark that which separates discourse 
from its excess"(1978, 125). Bataille's discourse must protect itself from the 
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appropriation of meaning. Hen ce, the concepts such as experience, interi or, sovereign 
have some contents. One has to pay attention to understand the contents of these 
concepts which are determined according to the law of their own sliding. One cannot 
ignore the play of difference in the writing of general economy. Therefore, "the 
reading of Bataille must pass through these dangerous straits"(Detrida 1978, 125). 
The error in ignoring these straits lies in the misinterpreting of the concepts in 
discourse. One cannot take the concepts as natural elements of a discourse. The 
isolation of concepts, detached from the discourse to which they belong, brings the 
erasure of the excess of non-ıneaning and falls back in to the closure of meaning. 
4.4. GENERAL WRITING 
Derrida claims that Bataille proposes a neutral knowledge rather than liberated 
knowledge. Bataille, of course, aimed to detach knowledge from metaphysical 
discourse(s). In that sense, he related the known to the unknown. Derrida claims, 
" W e must attentively consider the fact that it is not the sovereign operation, 
but discursive knowledge that is neutral. Neutrality has a negative essence (ne-
uter), is the negative side of transgression. Sovereignty is not neutral even if it 
neutralises, in its discourse, all the contradictions and all the oppositions of 
classical logic. Neutralisation is produced within knowledge and within the 
syntax of writing, but it is related to a sovereign and transgressive affırmation. 
The sovereign operation is not content with neutralising the classical operations 
in discourse; in the major form of experience it transgresses the law or 
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prohibitions that form a system with discourse, and even with the work of 
neutralisatioıl'(1978, 126). 
For Derrida, what erases the traces of classica1 discourse is not a1one the concept of 
sovereign, neither the sovereign operation. It is the discourse, of sovereignty, which 
neutra1ises metaphysical discourse. The problem in neutralising, neutralisation of the 
power of relating concepts is in the renunciation of the law which is the transgressing 
both of discourse and of the change of concepts. Hence, the difficulty arising in 
Bataille's discourse is the way of determining the meaning of transgression. While 
transgressing the discourse of Metaphysics, Bataille links the work of transgression to 
meaning and transgressive affirmation. This dangerous work puts his legal status at 
stake, because one risks immediacy and subordination. 
In that framework, the concepts are determined in relation to each other and the same 
time they destroy and neutralise each other. This transgression of discourse (law in 
general) confirms and conserves what it exceeds. Derrida claims, " This is the only 
way for it to affirm itse1f as transgression and thereby to accede to the sacred, which 
is presented in the violence of an infraction"(1978, 127). Bataille believes that this 
kind of transgression is different from the 'return to nature'. It does not suppress the 
prohibition. Therefore, for Bataille, it is use1ess to insist on Hege1's notion of 
'Aufhebung'. For Derrida, Bataille neglects the Hegelian character of this operation 
without contemplating the nature of Aufhebung both in Hegelian dialectic and his 
.... 
own operation. 
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For Bataille, taboo makes any rational order of society possible, but differently from 
Hegel, Bataille says that taboo does not have a rational basis itself. In that sense, 
Bataille starts from the work or production, but he searches another basis for the 
sacred in order to separate man from other beings. Therefore, the prohibitions, which 
regulate our social life, exceed a rational basis. According to Bataille, the world of 
prohibitions in its totality cannot be conceived as belonging to the world of work. 
Bataille, thus, uses the empty form of Aufhebung in order to link the world of 
meaning to the world of non-meaning. Derrida claims that Aufhebung in Hegel's 
dialectic does not exceed the world of work, so it belongs to the circle of absolute 
knowledge. On the contrary, Bataille attributes a positive characteristic to the term 
Aufhebung. For him, this term, the empty form of Aufhebung, implies the 
transgressive relationships between the world of meaning and the world of non-
meaning. Derrida sees that this displacement is 'paradigmatic'. He claims, 
" Within a form of writing, an intraphilosophical concept, the speculative 
concept par excellence, is forced to designate a movemcnt which properly 
constitutes the excess of every possible philosopheme. This moment then 
makes philosophy appear as a form natural or naive consciousness (which in 
He gel also means cultural consciousness )" ( 1978, 128). 
Bataille's use of empty form of Auflıebung refers to the transgression without 
suppressing, but this also requires the canfırmation of that which it exceeds. In that 
sense, Batailie has to go back to the Hegelian operation. Therefore the transgression 
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of transgression is necessary, because stated in terms of Hegelian discourse, within 
the restricted economy, it affırms transgressing with suppressing. 
Michel Foucault in his article "A Preface to Transgression" reconstructs Bataille's 
argument about transgression. For Foucault, transgression is an act which involves 
the limit. Foucault says, " it is likely that transgression has its entire space in the line 
it crosses"(Foucault in ed Botting and Wilson 1998, 128). For Foucault, limit opens 
to the limitless and fınds itself carried away by the content it had rejected. In that 
manner, transgression forces limit to the limit of its own being. Transgression "does 
not seek to oppose one thing to another"(Foucault 1998, 128-129). For Foucault 
transgression contains nothing negative and positive. Therefore, there can be no limit 
to restrict it. Transgression opens to the space of limitlessness into which it 1eaps. 
This is what B1anchot called the principle of contestation which is an affırmation that 
affırms nothing, a radical break of transitivity. 
Sovereign operation and the notion of general economy are very crucial in Bataille's 
writing. Bataille proposes a new form of writing with sovereign operation which is 
called general writing. In this respect, thıs is a relation to the non-ıneaning or the loss 
of meaning or the non- basis of meaning. Writing of general economy does not use 
new concepts but it takes concepts into consideration as they slide into one another. It 
makes this in a new way of writing. In that sense, "general writing affırms play and 
chance as the non-hasis of meaning"(Mutman 1995, 190). Foucault was right that 
transgression is neither negative nor positive, because the affırmation of chance and 
play as the rule or law transgresses discourse, but "such a transgression should also 
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confırm that which it exceeds, i.e. signifıcative discourse and law" (Mutman 1995, 
190). 
For Derrida, "Hegelian negative can no longer labor and let itself interrogated as the 
work of the negative" (Derrida 1978, 259-260). Instead of determining negativity as 
only a moment or a condition of meaning, Bataille and Derrida push the negative to 
its logica1 end. In that point, where the negative seerus an afterimage of something 
that resists all salvage by the system of meaning. Therefore, negativity is a resource 
for Derrida. Rodolphe Gasche in his book, The Tain of the Mirror, claims that " by 
annulling and equalising all oppositional forces in the mode of pro and contra, such 
an operation would not only stabilise these forces in an economy of decidable 
polarities, but would also be a free shot which aims nonetheless to collect its 
interests"(Gasche 1986, 138). Following Gasche , one can claim that Derrida's 
deconstruction controls the neutralising moments of any deconstruction (Bataille's 
sovereign operation). In that sense, deconstruction is not neutral and neutrality is the 
negative side oftransgression. In Bataille's sovereign operation, all the contradictions 
and all the oppositions of classicallogic are overcome-in the work of neutralisation. 
Neutralisation is a negative image of dcconstruction within discursive knowledge. 
Bataille's sovereign operation transgresses the law or prohibitions that form a system 
with discourse, but a transgression must, in order to affırm itself as transgression, 
conserve and confırm in one way or another that which it exceeds, in so far as it is 
only with respect to the limit it crosses, it can only consist of a sort of displacements 
of the limits and closure of the discourse. As Gasche claimed, " to exceed the 
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discourse of philosophy cannot possibly mean to step outside the closure, because the 
outside belongs to the categories of the inside. The excess of transgression of 
philosophy is, therefore, decided at the margins of the closure, only, in an always 
strategical- that is, historically fınite-fashion" ( Gasche ı 986, 139- ı 40). Gasche 
sharpens his analysis of transgression and he says "even in tral}sgressions, we are 
consorting with a code to which metaphysics is tied irreducibly, such that every 
transgressive gesture reencloses us- precisely by giving us a hold on the closure of 
metaphysics- within this closure. One is never installed within transgression, 
transgression implies that the limit is always at work"(Gasche ı986, 139-ı40). Even 
in transgression the concepts of outside and inside cannot be overcome, rather this 
activity produces an outside with regard to an inside. 
For Derrida, what exceeds meaning is the thought which is "given precisely as the 
thought for which there is no sure opposition between inside and outside" ( 198 ı, 12). 
This determination lies in the meaning of difference. For Hegel, difference is 
determined as contradiction that is meaningful difference. Therefore it becomes 
relation to the negative. The difference that such negatively characterised 'othemess' 
makes to thought is that it allows for reflexive determination in a developing 
dialectical system. Difference makes negativity one face of positivity in the self-
exposition of the absolute knowledge. That is why Derrida and Bataille, mostly the 
former, consider negativity as a resource. Gasche claims, 
.... 
" The infrastructures related to the origin, the principle, or the a pnon 
through inscription are in excess of phenomenality in general- that is in excess 
73 
of what represents the absolute possibility of the meaning of what is, of what 
exists: they are more and less than an origin. The infrastructural possibilities 
represent an irreducible plurality in contrast with the uniqueness of the origin 
that they make possible but also impossible, since the origin can never 
dominate their system"(1986, ı60-ı6ı). 
The reıation of this system to what it constitutes can no longer~ be deseribed as a 
linear genesis. Derrida claims that dissemination is true of inscription in general. It 
only affırms the play of thought. Thus, inscription contextualizes that which claims 
uniqueness and oneness. Therefore, deconstruction, for Gasche, reinscribes the origin 
into the context or text of its infrastructural possibilities. Gasche says, 
"Infrastructures are conditions as much of the impossibility as of the possibility of 
origins and grounds"(ı 986, ı 60- ı 6 ı). 
Derrida defınes inscription as a putting into relation and it has also a fiınction of 
linking two forms of writing: major and min or writing, two economies: restricted and 
general; as well as the known and the unknown, meaning and non-meaning, but none 
of the terms of these relations are the principle or ground of this inscription which is 
harmony, accord, or affinity. Inscription, the operation of deconstruction par 
excellence, is thus a form of accounting, but a mode of accounting that, like the 
principlcs it inscıibes, would account for itself: "At stake operation" or inscription, 
writes Derrida, "is not a self consciousness to maintain and to watch oneself. W e are 
not in the element ofphenomenology" (ı978, 264). Gasche claims that this operation 
can fiınction as that alterity that absolutely escapes the logic of philosophical 
accounting while at the same time accounting for it. Gasche says, "the infrastructures 
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or the deconstructive operation of inscription or 'mise en rapport' tries to subject 
something to itself, itself included, it turns into what it purports to account for. In 
order not to govem, in order not to be subjugated, it must subordinate nothing (direct 
object), that is to say, be subordinated to nothing or no one (servile mediation of the 
indirect object)"(1986, 161). For Gasche, thisisa 'rapport' (a putting into relation) in 
the form of 'non-rapport'. It is impossible to account for something that inscribes the 
operation of accounting in a cluster of structural possibilities that exclude their own 
self-domination and self-reflection. It is this impossibility of accounting that allows 
inscription, or 'mise en rapport' (at stak:e in the operation), to explain what it 
inscribes-the origins, the principle of legitimacy and responsibility. Thus, 
inscription, to inscribe or deconstruct or put into relation the transcendental 
conditions of possibilities with their structural possibilities is to displace the ground 
of reasonable speech. Gasche says, "this is not to annual or discord reasonable 
speech. On the contrary it is an attempt to count for the ratio, for the difference 
between rationality and irrationality, ina gesture that both fulfıls and transgresses the 
most insistent and intimate goal ofphilosophy" (1986, 163). 
4.5. BLANCHOT AND THE LlMIT-EXPERIENCE 
Derrida and Gasche showed that in order not to articulate meaning or in order to 
exceed the R,hilosophical discourse, the transgression of transgression is necessary. 
Derrida believes that general writing can accomplish this task. Maurice Blanchot's 
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article on Bataille "Affirmation and the passion of negative thought" also shows the 
possibility of transgressing the classical discourse without suppressing. 
Blanchot does not employ totally different language which would bring us closer to 
the truth. He also think:s the work of an accompanying discourse might limit itself, so 
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he develops a point from which one would better hear what only a reading can bring 
forth. Therefore, Blanchot manifests the possible experience as an impossibility 
which he calls 'limit-experience'. "Limit-experience is the response that man 
encounters when he has decided to put himself radically in question"(Blanchot, edited 
in. Botting and Wilson, 1998, pp: 42-43). For Blanchot, this is a movement of 
contestation that traverses all of history but it also closes up into a system. Passion of 
negative thought does not aim to work with classical philosophy' s scepticism or 
method. 
Blanchot claims that in an 'at stake' operation, man has a capacity to realise 
everything. He is capable of all the categories of knowledge and with the passion of 
negativity, man distinguishes himself from the nature. Negating himself and nature 
produces himself in producing the world. Therefore man achieves contentment to 
become discontent. He accomplishes this, because he carries through all his 
negations. As Blanchot argued, one cannot carry through and exhaust all his 
negations, since one cannot transform into power all nothingness that he is. On the 
other hand, lhe passion of negative thought or the desire to transgression is the 
experience of what is outside the who le when the who le excludes every outside. This 
is, Blanchot calls, the experience of the inaccessible, the unknown in itself. In that 
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sense, Bataille's notion of inner experience comes to the screen. Blanchot says," the 
interior experience is the manner in which this radİcal negation, a negation that has 
nothing more to negate, is affırmed"(1998, 45). Blanchot continues, 
" This is what we have just attempted to clarify by stating that this 
experience cannot be distinguished from contestation. It affırms nothing, 
communicates nothing. Maybe the affırmation is this nothing communicated. 
But there is a risk of substantializing this nothing. The limit experience is stili 
more extreme. This act of supreme negation we have just supposed stili belongs 
to the possible. Power, the power that is capable of everything- is able even to 
do away with itself as power. Such an act will in no way mak:e us accomplish 
the decisive step to the surprise of impossibility by allowing us to belong to this 
non-power that is not simply the negation ofpower"(1998, 45-46). 
For Blanchot, lİmit-experience is something like a new origin. What it offers to 
thought is an affırmation. Blanchot calls it 'the essential gift'. This affirmation does 
not affırm itself rather it affirms affirmation. Limit experience only reaches us at the 
limit when the limits fail (the experience of non-experience). This is what Bataille 
called chance and play. Blanchot claims, this point is the 'ultimate exigency' and it 
never offers itself as accomplished since no memory could confirm it. 
One can never comprehend Blanchot's notion of double affırmation as a path to a 
new origin which defines all discourses and suppresses them within the play of 
thought. In fact, Blanchot does not aim to reach a singularity in his discourse. Rather 
.... 
than the play of thought, with the second affirmation what he aims is to posit the 
plurality of speech in which what is essential is to reach an infinite affirmation. For 
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Blanchot, in the play of thought, a mutual promise is made that commits the play of 
thought to a common openness. An affirmation, which is always questioned by the 
thought, has a relation to the unknown. Blanchot claims that this affirmation is not 
sufficient for infinite affirmation. Hence, other can be defined with this second 
affırmation and it shows more than one origin or ground for th.e play of thought. 
Thus, as Derrida called it, the non-originary origin exceeds the discourse of presence 
or communication. The heterogeneity is provided in this form of experience and each 
time there is an infinite difference between interlocutors. This moment of turning 
together toward the infinite of affirmation is similar to the dialogue that occurs 
between two persons throwing dice. For Blanchot, speech is dice in the redoubling of 
affirmation. 
Bataille claims that writing, which is metaphoricity itself (Derrida), transgresses the 
hierarchical order of discourse and of the world associated with it. On the other hand, 
Derrida and Blanchot show that there is no any absolute transgression that differs in 
itself from discourse and law, although Derrida also thinks writing exceeds the 
classical operationsin metaphysics. One ofBataille's most radical gestures is to insert 
the ethnographic distinction sacred and profane into philosophical discussion. Post-
structuralist analysis reinscribes transgression within the intertextual field of 
philosophy. In this respect, Derrida, Blanchot and Foucault displays the meaning and 
the field of transgression. Bataille sees philosophy as totally other and in this act, he 
.... 
normalises the discourse of philosophy. General writing shows the impossibility of 
transgressing the other as other. Whether we call conversation or writing to this 
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infinite affirmation, a text (as a model of poetry), which is always more than itself, 
exceeds the production of a text within the play of thought. In this play, a text (as a 
possibility of general writing) can only open a window for heterogeneity by making 
itself slide with other texts. Hence, the infinite affirmation of thought can only be 
grasped when it escapes from us. The possibility of differenc:, thus, lies in the 
impossibility of awakening. 
One can place art in this play of thought and one can claim art has an indispensable 
role to play. Bataille devoted a specific article to a discussion. In the early primitive 
art in the caves of Lascaux, Georges Bataille speaks of 'the birth of art'. 
4.6. THE CAVES OF LASCAUX AND THE BIRTH OF ART 
Bataille calls the fındings of early primitive art in the caves of Lascaux around Paris 
miraculous. He deseribes these paintings witlı a strong feeling of excess and presence. 
Bataille says, "men were suddenly seized by an acceleration of movements, an 
unexpected overstepping that intoxicates and, like strong alcohol, gives a feeling of 
power"(1955, 23). 
Bataille's study of Lascaux presents transgression in relation to a sacred moment of 
figuration: Lascaux painting that links the origin of art to the origin of species, that is, 
human bein~ as subjects of transgression. Thus, Bataille rewrites the history of a 
world of the sacred as against the history of a world of reason. Lascaux transfigures 
us, Bataille writes, and it does so through a force of fıguration that transfıxes and 
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fascinates. If Lascaux transfigures us, it also transfigures animality, and this involves 
a double gesture. The paintings in the cave transfigure the animal they figure, giving 
it a beautiful form. It is precisely this transfiguration- one that passes through the 
figure- that transfigures us. But at the same time, the very seductive force of the 
painted figures also transfıgures the artist who created them, tral}sforming the cave 
man from animal to man. 
For Bataille, if art is bom of emotion and addresses itself to emotion, the sentiment 
experienced by historic man is felt by us to paraUel our own. What overwhelms us at 
Lascaux, for Bataille, is the useless fıguration of these signs that seduce. According 
to Bataille, transfıguration of us is the sign for the transfıguration of the other. This 
communication, this circuit of emotion, the one that links art and the sacred, perforrus 
the origin of art and the origin of man at the same time. Bataille tries to pass from 
non-person to person through an act of fıguration received as an act of address. An 
address that crosses death and time, because it collapses linear time. In that 
framework we become the subject of transgression. Man becomes animal and vice 
versa and the difference(s) between them disappears. The most critical point in that 
commentary is the status of (the) thing or (the) work of art. While defıning art or 
transgression as the other of discourse, the sing.ılarity of work is destroyed. Bataille 
identifıes the law of transgression with the necessity of fıguration that is origin of art 
and of man. 
Lascaux gives us the image of the origin of art inasmuch as it gives us the origin of 
art as image. It also suggests one ongın of the meaning of the story of 
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interdiction/transgression, namely Bataille's meditation on the origin of prehistoric 
figurative art. Interdiction and transgression do not give us the key to Lascaux. 
Rather, primitive art yields the seeret of the theory of altcration and provides the 
interpretation of its change of meaning through the dual operation of the sacred. 
"Lascaux" is the story of this story, that is, the origin of art as origin oftransgression. 
The reason Bataille gives a special place to the figurative images of the animals is not 
only that they illustrate his theoretical fiction ( especially the hybrid figure of the 
man-beast) but because, when they are interpreted asa reversal of meaning through 
the theory of alteration, they bear witness to the refusal of the human world of work, 
which corresponds to the moment of sacred transgression. The visual realism of the 
animal figures gives a m eaning of refusal to the representations of the human, w hi ch 
are construed as having been denied the light of appearance or subjected to wilful 
deformation, sin ce the animal images attest to the figurative powers of the prehistoric 
artists. The difference implies that the human was represented as inhuman and guides 
Bataille's interpretation of this gesture as a refusal of the human world of work. 
This all depends, however, on the uselessness of these figures, for it is only as such 
that they can inscribe the sacred moment of transgression in their figuration. Bataille 
refuses the conventional interpretation of the animal paintings, which endows them 
with magical force in an instrumental sense, placing them in the service of a ritual 
whose aim was to enhance hunting prospects. He allows that the creation of these 
figures was a magical operation, but he insulates this notion of the magical from any 
instrumentality. For Bataille, the magical nature of artistic creation implies that a 
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value of work has been superseded by a value of the sacred; it implies a recognition 
that no amount of work could obtain the desired result, and hence abnegates human 
instrumental powers. Bataille wants to convince us that these paintings were useless 
to primitive man, created in sheer exuberance as a celebration of the magical per se, 
the sacred. 
What he does not explicitly say, however, is that it is just as important that these 
images remain useless to us. Otherwise they would lose their power of seduction and 
cease to communicate. But the paintings do not operate this resemblance by a self-
portrait that would allow us to see ourselves in an image, and so verify the 
resemblance. Instead it is the inhuman figure that marks the passage to the human; we 
see only the non-person. 
The paintings do not give us the image our curiosity demands: the portrait of the 
caveman. They convey no useful information, yet in their uselessness they seduce us 
and enable us to find our "sensible presence" in the cave. It is the mask, the inhuman 
(all too human) figure of the animal that guarantees the uselessness ofthese images--
to us. And it is the figural image that bears witness to transgre&sion and perforrus our 
transfiguration into divine animaL 
Sacrifice opens up a different dimension of time-lost: time-for sacrifice is the 
catastrophe of time as experience of being, that is, of time as being, or being as time. 
In Lascaux, transgression occurs through the figure or the fiction-for Bataille there is 
nothing less like a thing than the useless figure. Figuration is necessary so that the 
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play of dissimulation can occur and inscribe the animal into a second-order circuit of 
address which passes through the image. The fıgure is necessary for an act of address 
to communicate across time-to trans-fıgure. It is the fıctive that operates the 
reciprocal relationship of future, past, and present time in the afterlife of images. 
For Bataille, the representations of animals in Lascaux paintings were situated in an 
ambiguous way. Hence the ambiguous status of animal fıgures shows what is at the 
centre of fıguration, Bataille calls this 'alteration'. This alteration is specifıcally 
characterised by an act of destruction. For Bataille, this defınes all representation. In 
this respect, primitive art is functional and different from the history of art which 
reflects the history of reason and technology. This explanation can be used against 
Bataille. If prehistoric art is the other or the origin of art, it is situated within the same 
status, rather the beginning of art shows also the end of art. For Derrida, the 
orientation of this symbolic act must be displaced. This process of becoming other, at 
least for Derrida, is marked by a writing which is olderthan the symbolic past that it 
produces. As Blanchot emphasised, at Lascaux, "art is not beginning, nor is man 
beginning" (1997, 10). 
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CHAPTER5 
5. CONCLUSION 
As Dennis Rolher argued in his book 'Against Architecture' the transgression in 
Bataille is "the transgression of form"(1989, 24). Hollier claims that form is 
discourse's temptation. Discourse is developed and then become fıxed by means of 
taking form. For Hollier, in some ways Bataille escapes from this and saves the 
violence of desire from the temptation of form. The term 'writing' indicates this 
refusal, a refusal that produces heterogeneity. Hollier thinks that this does not mean 
to reduce everything to this refusal or to make writing the locus of a new totality. 
Moreover Hollier claims, "writing does not acknowledge any privilege, bence also 
does not acknowledge privilege for itself "(1989, 24). For Bataille, writing produces 
a hole where totality beccnıes incomplete, so writing marks this incompletion. 
Bataille claims that this transgression is never an object of knowledge or recogniticn. 
Hollier argues that "form is the temptation of discourse to arrest itself, to fıx on 
itself, to fınish itself offby producing and appropriating its own end"(1989, 24-5). In 
this respect, .... for Hollier, Bataille's writing endlessly deforms itself and disguises 
itself. The writing is always already in connection with death. Bataille was conscious 
of the fact that only death can bring to an end the language that he used, so for 
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Bataille, "writing is never more than a game played with an ungraspable 
reality"(l961, 59). Hollier argues that nowhere in Bataille's writing one can 
disapprove this, nowhere does writing meet with the opportunity to conform itself. 
Hollier says, " instead of completion, obliteration"(l989, 25). 
In that framework, transgression does not belong to theory but to practice. Writing 
shows one of the modes of this practice. The dead person, Bataille himself, does 
cease or end to 'play'. As Hollier argued, without death there can be no room for 
play. The meaning goes back to itself without completing itself. The corpse, the death 
body puts meaning in play. The meaning put in play by Bataille's writing expands 
itself. Hollier claims, "meaning exists only at risk"(l989, 25). 
Bataılle believes that scıence and philosophy would like to fix and accumulate 
meaning in a closed languag~, so they invest meaning in the lexicon. For Bataille, 
there is no meaning except through sacrifice which is meaningless. In dictionary, 
every word refers to the other, so there is always mutual references in dictionaries. 
For Bataille it is not easy to escape from this system in language. However, sciences 
determine the rules of this game in which the moment of words is determined, so 
they stop the circulation. For Bataille, this can be transgressed by the transgression of 
the lexical stability. Hollier says, 
"There..,is no possible dictionary for a language whose violent syntax undoes 
the meaning of all those words. Whereas the formal discourses, science or 
philosophy, because they want to retain meaning, are condemned to be totally 
meaningless, the paradoxical project of such a dictionary would consist not in 
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endowing words with one or more meanıngs but ın expending them 
unthinkingly"(1989, 27). 
For Bataille, painters need no dictionary. This is in contrast to what sciences 
construct, whose production is encoded in a language requiring specifıc dictionaries. 
Literature, joining modem painting in its critique of sciences' architecture, works 
against dictionary and grammar. 
In Documents, Bataille assembles the style of subversion of lexical order. In this 
respect, Bataille no longer rejects "the fundamental distribution of language between 
signifıer and signified, but disceming behind the meaning, and sometimes 
independent of the meaning, what 'job' words do"(Hollier 1989, 28). In Documents, 
Bataille tries to wrest lexical units from the symbolic code. Hence, he put these units 
into relation with extralinguistic practices, so the word is not defıned by what it 
means but by what it does, by the effects it induces. 
Breton and Eluard had also started a new project with the manifesto of surrealism. 
They had a promise to subvert the dictionary. Besides, there was not any detailed 
work in surrealist project. They only proposed unexpected associations between the 
word and its defınition. In this respect for Hollier, Bataille's project is more 
comprehensive than the surrealist project. 
Bataille fırsN;tarted to transgress the meaning of dictionary, because for him this is 
the fırst and the most important difficulty placed at the heart of the discourse that one 
has to transgress. The second transgression ıs "the valorisation of 
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formlessness"(Hollier 1989, 29). For Bataille every dictionary aims to repress the 
function and the real usage of this word, 'formless'. Bataille defınes this word as 
such, 
"A dictionary would start from the moment in which it no longer provides 
the meaning of words but their job. Fonnless is thus not merely an adjective 
with such and such a meaning but a term for lowering status with its implied 
requirement that everything have a form. Whatever it (formless) designates 
lacks entitlement in every sense and is crushed on the spot, like a spider or an 
earthworm. For academics to be content, the universe would have to assume a 
form. All of philosophy has no other goal: it is a matter of fıtting what is there 
into a formal coat, a rnathematical overcoat. On the other hand to assert that the 
universe resembles nothing else and is only fonnless comes down to stating that 
the universe is something like a spider or spit"(Bataille quoted in Hollier 1989, 
30). 
Bataille differentiates words' meaning from their 'job'. To privilege meaning at the 
expanse of work is to believe that practise can be put into parentheses. For Bataille 
the job cannot be reduced to the usage. Usage introduces a certain kind of historicity 
of language because it refers to the current linguistic practices. In that sense, usage is 
dominated by the category of meaning. On the other hand job refers to a different 
order. Hollier argues that "it indicates all those processes of repulsion or seduction 
aroused by the word independent ofits meaning"(1989, 30). 
As Hollier ar~ed, the job of the word contains the reaction of disgust accompanying 
its utterance. Therefore it is presented in this state of affairs, so one must evaluate 
formlessness by taking into consideration this locus of an event. This, in fact, is not a 
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means for the expressian of meaning. Bataille's project allows us to shatter the 
accumulation of meaning. Writing provides the possibility of the locus of this fissile 
energy in which the formless as unnamable is put at stake. In fact, Bataille's project 
is not only limited with the reconfıguration of dictionaries. The nameless is excluded 
from reproduction. Hollier argues that through the 'formless', ".!3ataille's language 
opens up onto an incomplete universe with which his interrupted dictionary 
communicates through this very wound, through this flaw in form that prevents it 
from folding back on itself" (1989, 31). 
Briony Fer in her article 'Bataille on Painting' is concemed with the ways in which 
the constellation of metaphors of dust relates to Bataille' s view of the origins of 
modem painting. Fer mainly focuses on how Bataille deseribed reality disintegrated 
into dust in Miro's work. In Documents, Bataille deseribed the metaphor of dust as 
the pleasure of not seeing, or at least of not seeing clearly. It is as if grains and specks 
produces a field of vision in which they form a veil against the light. For Bataille this 
idea is connected to the fact that "the art of picture making Ii es not in compositıon, as 
it is normally understood, but in decomposition"(Fer ed in Bailey Gi111995, 155). 
Both the word 'formless' and the metaphor of dust shows in what sense Bataille 
focuses on thelossor the void in representation. For Bataille, Miro's work provides 
us with a theoretical basis in which decomposition or the relation between word and 
meaning, image and text or 'tbin.g' and image are obliterated. 
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In Documents Bataille gives a critica! account of surrealism. For him, the surrealists' 
project fails in showing the impossible character ofrepresentation. Surrealists change 
only the forms of objects. In that sense, Bataille emphasises the need for 'work' in 
order to have the possibility of heterogeneity. In that framework, Bataille claims that 
servility is essential to communication and society, and sovere_ignty can only be 
exposed by 'work'. Hence, sovereignty, appearing in the form of servility, cannot be 
detached from servility. In fact, for Bataille sovereignty belongs to the sacrifice and it 
can only be revealed by 'inner experience' or the 'impossible'. At that point, Bataille 
believes that general economy is the locus of exteriority in which the true nature of 
sacred is unveiled. However, this last point takcs us back to the fact that sovereignty 
can only be revealed by profanity, but for Bataille, sovereign operation in the end 
transgresses profanity, either by revcaling the essentiality of the sacred or in order to 
manifest this essentiality. For one thing, this conclusion is paradoxical because 
sovereign operation becomes something more than the difference denoted by the 
relation between servility and sovereignty. Consequently, the possibility of sovereign 
operation li es in the difference rather than the essentiality of the sacred. A yearning 
for an essential basis for lost community takes us back to the primitive societies' 
consecrations and rituals in Bataille's discourse. This basis reconstructs both the 
concept of primitiveness as an originary experience and the meaning of society in 
contemporary world with respect to the experience of sacred. Therefore, the 
difference b~tween sacred and profanity shows the priority of the experience of 
sacred, so the difference between them is reconstructed by this experience. This 
dislocates the relation between them and reduces the experience of the difference 
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between them to the hierarchical knowledge. This ıs the maın problematic ın 
Bataille's discourse that we have to recover. 
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